I joined Stirling in September 2007 as an RCUK Academic Fellowship, shortly after having completed my PhD in Barcelona. After 5 years, in 2012, the position turned into a Lectureship and I am now, since August 2015, a Senior Lecturer.
I hold an Associate Fellowship with the Logos Research Group (Barcelona). .
I work primarily on modality; both its metaphysics and its epistemology. For the past several years, however, I’ve been working mostly on its epistemology.
Up to recently, my task has been devoted to explaining why the epistemologies of modality one finds in the literature don’t meet their targets. The results of this negative task—which has involved the study of the views of salient philosophers in the field, like Chalmers, Peacocke, Williamson and Yablo, among others—has been published in journals such as Dialectica, Logique et Analyse, Noûs, and Philosophia Scientiae.
My research is now at a transitional period between the negative and the positive tasks involved in my research project on the epistemology of modality. I’m developing my positive views which, it is intended, should provide at least some of the explanation that, as I’ve motivated, the rationalist have failed to provide. My recent research has been supported by institutional research leaves and by an AHRC Leadership Fellowship for the project ‘Towards a non-uniform epistemology of modality’.
As I am envisioning it, a comprehensive view on the epistemology of modality will not be uniform. Rather, it will (necessarily) provide substantially different type of explanations for different subdomains. In this direction, and as a first approximation, I have sketched my views on de re modal knowledge about concrete entities in: ‘Similarity and Possibility. An epistemology of de re possibility for concrete entities’. This paper is part of a volume--Modal Epistemology after Rationaslism--edited by Bob Fischer and Felipe Leon that aims to mark a turn away from (uniform) rationalism.
I am currently working on what sort of epistemology is available to explain our de re modal knowledge about abstract entities
Roca Royes S (2018) Rethinking the Epistemology of Modality for Abstracta. In: Fred-Rivera I & Leech J (eds.) Being Necessary: Themes of Ontology and Modality from the Work of Bob Hale. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 245 - 266.
Roca-Royes S (2017) Similarity and Possibility: An epistemology of de re possibility for concrete entities. In: Fischer B & Leon F (eds.) Modal epistemology after rationalism. Synthese Library, 378. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, pp. 221-245. http://www.springer.com/gb/book/9783319443072; https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44309-6_12
Roca-Royes S (2016) Rethinking origin essentialism (for artefacts). In: Jago M (ed.) Reality Making. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 152-176. http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755722.001.0001/acprof-9780198755722
Roca-Royes S (2009) How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties (Book Review). Review of: How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties, Penelope Mackie, Oxford: Clarendon, 2006, xii+212 pp, ISBN 0-19-927220-4. Philosophical Review, 118 (2), pp. 266-269. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2008-052
Roca-Royes S (2007) Mind-Independence and Modal Empiricism. In: Penco C, Vignolo M, Ottonelli V & Amoretti C (eds.) Proceedings of the 4th Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy (LMAP-2007), Genoa, Italy, September 20-22, 2007. CEUR-WS Proceedings, 278. Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy, Genoa, 20.09.2007-22.09.2007. CEUR Workshop Proceedings, pp. 117-135. http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-278/