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Article

Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge

Citation
Roca-Royes S (2011) Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge. Nous, 45 (1), pp. 22-49. http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/117997227/home; https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00757.x

Abstract
The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge.

Keywords
Conceivability; Epistemology of Modality; De Re Modality; Essentialism; Modality (Logic; Essentialism (Philosophy); Life Origin

Journal
Nous: Volume 45, Issue 1

StatusPublished
Author(s)Roca-Royes, Sonia
Publication date31/03/2011
URLhttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/1951
PublisherWiley-Blackwell
Publisher URLhttp://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/117997227/home
ISSN0029-4624
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