Roca-Royes S (2010) Modal epistemology, modal concepts, and the Integration Challenge. Dialectica, 64 (3), pp. 335-361. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2010.01236.x
The paper argues against Peacocke's moderate rationalism in modality. In the first part, I show, by identifying an argumentative gap in its epistemology, that Peacocke's account has not met the Integration Challenge. I then argue that we should modify the account's metaphysics of modal concepts in order to avoid implausible consequences with regards to their possession conditions. This modification generates no extra explanatory gap. Yet, once the minimal modification that avoids those implausible consequences is made, the resulting account cannot support Peacocke's moderate rationalism.
Dialectica: Volume 64, Issue 3