A priori knowledge and persistent (dis)agreement

Citation

Roca Royes S (2017) A priori knowledge and persistent (dis)agreement. In: Dodd D & Zardini E (eds.) The A Priori: Its Significance, Sources, and Extent. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://global.oup.com/academic/?cc=gb&lang=en&

Abstract
The phenomenon of persistent disagreement is large especially in areas, like Philosophy, where knowledge is typically thought to be a priori. This phenomenon has been taken by some to threaten even the possibility of philosophical knowledge. This paper opposes such a pessimistic diagnostic, but in a qualified manner. By first motivating a non-conformist position on the epistemic significance of disagreement, I defend that knowledge is made no less possible by our awareness of the disagreements. And yet—the qualification goes—the disagreement makes us blind to whether we know. The scope of this diagnosis needs to be properly measured, and this is done, in the second part of the paper, by separation of cases.

Keywords
A priori knowledge; epistemology; persistent disagreement; ordinary disagreement

Notes
Output status: Forthcoming

People

Dr Sonia Roca Royes

Senior Lecturer, Philosophy