I work primarily on modality; both its metaphysics and its epistemology. For the past several years, however, I’ve been working mostly on its epistemology.
Up to recently, my task has been devoted to explaining why the epistemologies of modality one finds in the literature don’t meet their targets. The results of this negative task—which has involved the study of the views of salient philosophers in the field, like Chalmers, Peacocke, Williamson and Yablo, among others—has been published in journals such as Dialectica, Logique et Analyse, Noûs, and Philosophia Scientiae.
My research is now at a transitional period between the negative and the positive tasks involved in my research project on the epistemology of modality. I’m developing my positive views which, it is intended, should provide at least some of the explanation that, as I’ve motivated, the rationalist have failed to provide. My recent research has been supported by institutional research leaves and by an AHRC Leadership Fellowship for the project ‘Towards a non-uniform epistemology of modality’.
As I am envisioning it, a comprehensive view on the epistemology of modality will not be uniform. Rather, it will (necessarily) provide substantially different type of explanations for different subdomains. In this direction, and as a first approximation, I have sketched my views on de re modal knowledge about concrete entities in: ‘Similarity and Possibility. An epistemology of de re possibility for concrete entities’. This paper is part of a volume--Modal Epistemology after Rationaslism--edited by Bob Fischer and Felipe Leon that aims to mark a turn away from (uniform) rationalism.
I am currently working on what sort of epistemology is available to explain our de re modal knowledge about abstract entities