Article
Ashton NA & Cruft R (2021) Rethinking the Post-Truth Polarisation Narrative: Social Roles and Hinge Commitments in the Plural Public Sphere. Political Quarterly, 92 (4), pp. 598-605. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923x.13032
About me
About me
I'm working at Stirling as part of the AHRC-funded project "Norms for the New Public Sphere". For the three years before this I worked on the ERC-funded project "The Emergence of Relativism" at the University of Vienna. For the three years before that I did my PhD at the University of Edinburgh.
Research
My research concerns the political and social aspects of epistemology - specifically the effects of oppression and power on epistemic justification. So far my work has focused on the theoretical side of things, exploring feminist standpoint theory, hinge epistemology, and epistemic relativism. In Stirling I'll be working on the practical implications of these views, investigating what their insights about epistemic justification tell us about organising institutions which produce and disseminate knowledge.
The most up-to-date record of my research outputs is likely here: https://philpeople.org/profiles/natalie-alana-ashton/publications
Outputs (11)
Outputs
Book Chapter
Extended Rationality and Epistemic Relativism
Ashton NA (2021) Extended Rationality and Epistemic Relativism. In: Moretti L & Pedersen NJLL (eds.) Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill Studies in Skepticism, 3. Leiden: Brill, pp. 55-72. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004465534_004
Book Chapter
Relativism in Feminist Epistemologies
Ashton NA (2020) Relativism in Feminist Epistemologies. In: Ashton NA, Kusch M, McKenna R & Anna Sodoma K (eds.) Social Epistemology and Relativism. Routledge Studies in Epistemology. London: Routledge, pp. 87-102. https://www.routledge.com/Social-Epistemology-and-Relativism/Ashton-Kusch-McKenna-Sodoma/p/book/9780367189389
Book Chapter
Scientific Perspectives, Feminist Standpoints, and Non-silly Relativism
Ashton NA (2020) Scientific Perspectives, Feminist Standpoints, and Non-silly Relativism. In: Crețu A & Massimi M (eds.) Knowledge from a Human Point of View. Synthese Library: Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, 416. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, pp. 71-85. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27041-4_5
Book Chapter
Relativising Epistemic Advantage
Ashton N (2020) Relativising Epistemic Advantage. In: Kusch M (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge Handbooks of Philosophy. London: Routledge, pp. 329-338. https://www.routledge.com/The-Routledge-Handbook-of-Philosophy-of-Relativism-1st-Edition/Kusch/p/book/9781138484283
Article
Situating Feminist Epistemology
Ashton NA & McKenna R (2020) Situating Feminist Epistemology. Episteme, 17 (1), pp. 28-47. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.11
Edited Book
Social Epistemology and Relativism
Ashton NA, Kusch M, McKenna R & Sodoma KA (eds.) (2020) Social Epistemology and Relativism. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429199356
Article
Rethinking Epistemic Relativism
Ashton NA (2019) Rethinking Epistemic Relativism. Metaphilosophy, 50 (5), pp. 587-607. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12389
Article
The Case for a Feminist Hinge Epistemology
Ashton NA (2019) The Case for a Feminist Hinge Epistemology. Wittgenstein-Studien, 10 (1), pp. 153-163. https://doi.org/10.1515/witt-2019-0009
Book Review
Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology
Ashton NA (2017) Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology. Review of:
Annalisa Coliva, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). Pp. xi + 221. ISBN 978-1-137-50188-2. The Philosophical Quarterly, 67 (266), pp. 169-171. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv122
Article
Undercutting Underdetermination-Based Scepticism
Ashton NA (2015) Undercutting Underdetermination-Based Scepticism. Theoria, 81 (4), pp. 333-354. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12076