Relativism in Feminist Epistemologies
Ashton NA (2020) Relativism in Feminist Epistemologies. In: Ashton NA, Kusch M, McKenna R & Anna Sodoma K (eds.) Social Epistemology and Relativism. Routledge Studies in Epistemology. London: Routledge, pp. 87-102. https://www.routledge.com/Social-Epistemology-and-Relativism/Ashton-Kusch-McKenna-Sodoma/p/book/9780367189389
Different views on the connection between relativism and feminist epistemologies are often asserted but rarely are these views clearly argued for. This has resulted in a confusingly polarised debate, with some people convinced that feminist epistemologies are committed to relativism (and that this is a reason so be suspicious of them) whilst others make similar criticisms of anti-feminist views and argue that relativism has no place in feminist epistemologies. This chapter is an attempt to clarify this debate. I begin by asking the question “are feminist projects and goals best served by relativism, or by absolutism?” I then sketch out four broad positions one could take on the answer to this question, and evaluate arguments for each one. In the end I conclude that feminist projects can, at least sometimes, be served by relativism, and that the claim they can be served by anti-relativism is under-supported.
|Funders||Arts and Humanities Research Council|
|Title of series||Routledge Studies in Epistemology|
|Publication date online||09/03/2020|
|Place of publication||London|