Book Chapter

Relativism in Feminist Epistemologies

Citation

Ashton NA (2020) Relativism in Feminist Epistemologies. In: Ashton NA, Kusch M, McKenna R & Anna Sodoma K (eds.) Social Epistemology and Relativism. Routledge Studies in Epistemology. London: Routledge, pp. 87-102. https://www.routledge.com/Social-Epistemology-and-Relativism/Ashton-Kusch-McKenna-Sodoma/p/book/9780367189389

Abstract
Different views on the connection between relativism and feminist epistemologies are often asserted but rarely are these views clearly argued for. This has resulted in a confusingly polarised debate, with some people convinced that feminist epistemologies are committed to relativism (and that this is a reason so be suspicious of them) whilst others make similar criticisms of anti-feminist views and argue that relativism has no place in feminist epistemologies. This chapter is an attempt to clarify this debate. I begin by asking the question “are feminist projects and goals best served by relativism, or by absolutism?” I then sketch out four broad positions one could take on the answer to this question, and evaluate arguments for each one. In the end I conclude that feminist projects can, at least sometimes, be served by relativism, and that the claim they can be served by anti-relativism is under-supported.

StatusPublished
FundersArts and Humanities Research Council
Title of seriesRoutledge Studies in Epistemology
Publication date31/12/2020
Publication date online31/03/2020
URLhttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/31912
PublisherRoutledge
Publisher URLhttps://www.routledge.com/…ok/9780367189389
Place of publicationLondon
ISBN9780429199356
eISBN9780429199356