Citation Ashton NA (2019) Rethinking Epistemic Relativism. Metaphilosophy, 50 (5), pp. 587-607. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12389
Abstract ‘Relativism’ is often treated as a dirty word in philosophy. Showing that a view entails relativism is almost always considered tantamount to showing that it is nonsensical. However, relativistic theories are not entirely unappealing – they have features which might be tempting if they weren’t thought to be outweighed by problematic consequences. In this paper I argue that it’s possible to secure the intuitively appealing features of at least one kind of relativism – epistemic relativism – without having to accept any problematic consequences. I do this by defending what I call 'stratified relativism'.
Keywords epistemic relativism; epistemic justification; social roles; equal validity; hinge epistemology