Ashton NA (2019) The Case for a Feminist Hinge Epistemology. Wittgenstein-Studien, 10 (1), pp. 153-163. https://doi.org/10.1515/witt-2019-0009
In this paper I make the case for a feminist hinge epistemology in three steps. My first step is to explain hinge epistemologies as contemporary epistemologies that take Wittgenstein’s work in On Certainty as their starting point. My second step is to make three criticisms of this literature as it currently stands. My third step is to introduce feminist epistemologies, which argue that social factors like race and gender affect what different people and groups justifiably believe, and argue that developing a feminist hinge epistemology is both plausible (because of important similarities between the two kinds of views) and desirable (because feminist epistemologies have resources which can help hinge epistemologies to avoid the three problems that I have raised).
Wittgenstein-Studien: Volume 10, Issue 1
|Publication date online||16/01/2019|
|Date accepted by journal||19/05/2018|
|Publisher||Walter de Gruyter GmbH|