The Case for a Feminist Hinge Epistemology


Ashton NA (2019) The Case for a Feminist Hinge Epistemology. Wittgenstein-Studien, 10 (1), pp. 153-163.

In this paper I make the case for a feminist hinge epistemology in three steps. My first step is to explain hinge epistemologies as contemporary epistemologies that take Wittgenstein’s work in On Certainty as their starting point. My second step is to make three criticisms of this literature as it currently stands. My third step is to introduce feminist epistemologies, which argue that social factors like race and gender affect what different people and groups justifiably believe, and argue that developing a feminist hinge epistemology is both plausible (because of important similarities between the two kinds of views) and desirable (because feminist epistemologies have resources which can help hinge epistemologies to avoid the three problems that I have raised).

Wittgenstein-Studien: Volume 10, Issue 1

FundersEuropean Commission
Publication date31/01/2019
Publication date online16/01/2019
Date accepted by journal19/05/2018
PublisherWalter de Gruyter GmbH