Wheeler M (2012) Naturalizing Dasein and other (Alleged) Heresies. In: Kiverstein J & Wheeler M (eds.) Heidegger and Cognitive Science. New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, pp. 176-212. http://www.palgrave.com/products/title.aspx?pid=297771
First paragraph: To my mind, being wrong is nowhere near as disheartening as being boring, so I am encouraged by the fact that, in the four chapters immediately preceding this one, four thinkers for whom I have nothing but the utmost intellectual respect have found my ongoing project to articulate the philosophical groundwork for a genuinely Heideggerian cognitive science interesting enough that they have taken the trouble to explain precisely why it is flawed. Just how deep the supposed flaws go depends on which set of criticisms one chooses to read. For Ratcliffe and Rehberg they go very deep indeed, since, for these thinkers, there is a sense in which the very idea of a Heideggerian cognitive science borders on the incoherent. Dreyfus and Rietveld, on the other hand, seem to agree with me that something worth calling a Heideggerian cognitive science is certainly possible; it's just that my version of it is seriously defective.