Wheeler M (2018) Knowledge, Credit, and the Extended Mind, or what Calvisius Sabinus got Right. In: Carter A, Clark A, Kallestrup J, Palermos S & Pritchard D (eds.) Extended Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 147-161. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/extended-epistemology-9780198769811?cc=gb〈=en&
According to one prominent view in contemporary epistemology, the correct application of one’s cognitive abilities in believing truly is necessary and sufficient for a kind of credit that is, in turn, necessary for knowledge. Epistemologists who hold this view typically take the cognitive abilities concerned to be based in states and processes that are spatially located inside the head of the knowing subject. Enter the hypothesis of extended cognition (henceforth ExC). According to ExC, the physical machinery of mind sometimes extends beyond the skull and skin. The present chapter will explore what happens when the credit condition on knowledge is brought into contact with ExC. Via discussions of (a) empirical psychological work on the adaptive character of technologically augmented memory and (b) thought experiments from the extended cognition and extended knowledge literatures, conclusions will be drawn for our understanding of 'knowledge in the wild'.