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University of Stirling



Logical Non-Cognitivism

Wright C (2018) Logical Non-Cognitivism. Philosophical Issues, 28 (1), pp. 425-450.

In this paper, I return to issues explored in Wright (2001) and (2004). The abstract for the latter begins with the sentences, The essay addresses the well‐known idea that there has to be a place for intuition, thought of as a kind of non‐ inferential rational insight, in the epistemology of basic logic if our knowledge of its principles is non‐ empirical and is to allow of any finite, non‐circular reconstruction. It is argued that the error in this idea consists in its overlooking the possibility that there is, properly speaking, no knowledge of the validity of principles of basic logic.

Philosophical Issues: Volume 28, Issue 1

Author(s)Wright, Crispin
FundersJohn Templeton Foundation
Publication date31/10/2018
Publication date online17/09/2018
Date accepted by journal15/07/2018
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