Sine praejudicio? Economics and the 2014 Scottish independence referendum

Citation

Dow S, McMaster R & Cumbers A (2018) Sine praejudicio? Economics and the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 42 (3), pp. 597-615. https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/bex091

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the contribution of expert economic opinion to the 2014 referendum campaigns on Scottish independence. We argue that the input from economics to both sides of the debate, as well as to independent analysis, was constrained by a mainstream economics framing. The result was a focus on calculable outcomes predicated on unchanging institutions and behaviour, and the question of currency arrangements that assumes the status quo is an optimal currency area. As the consequences of constitutional change for institutions and behaviour are uncertain, an equilibrium framework treats anything beyond calculable prediction as a shock, inducing fear of the unknown. In contrast, a political economy approach is tailored to analysing uncertain developments and encompassing the broader issues relating to values, democracy and power, and is thus better suited to the analysis of constitutional change.

Keywords
Constitutional change; Argument; Keynes’ weight of argument; Scottishindependence referendum; Political economy

Journal
Cambridge Journal of Economics: Volume 42, Issue 3

People

Professor Sheila Dow

Emeritus Professor, Economics