Melis G (2018) The Intertwinement of Propositional and Doxastic Justification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96 (2), pp. 367-379. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2017.1342097
One important distinction in the debate over epistemic justification is the one between propositional and doxastic justification. Roughly, while doxastic justification is a property of beliefs, propositional justification is a property of propositions. On a rather common view, which accounts for doxastic justification in terms of propositional justification plus the so-called ‘basing relation’, propositional justification is seen as the prior notion, and doxastic justification is explained in terms of it. According to the opposing view, the direction of explanation needs to be reversed, and doxastic justification should be seen as primary. I distinguish between two notions of priority, and I argue that they give different verdicts with respect to the issue of which notion of justification comes first. The lesson may be taken to be that propositional and doxastic justification are in a relation of intertwinement.
propositional justification; doxastic justification; conceptual priority; theoretical priority
Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Volume 96, Issue 2