Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason

Citation

Way J (2010) Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason. Philosophical Studies, 147 (2), pp. 213-233. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9277-2

Abstract
The Wide-Scope approach to instrumental reason holds that the requirement to intend the necessary means to your ends should be understood as a requirement to either intend the means, or else not intend the end. In this paper I explain and defend a neglected version of this approach. I argue that three serious objections to Wide-Scope accounts turn on a certain assumption about the nature of the reasons that ground the Wide-Scope requirement. The version of the Wide-Scope approach defended here allows us to reject this assumption, and so defuse the objections.

Keywords
Instrumental reason; Wide-scope; Object-given and state-given reasons; Broome; Setiya; Kolodny; Reasons; Rationality; Reason; Objectivity; Practical reason

Journal
Philosophical Studies: Volume 147, Issue 2