Citation Wheeler M (2009) The Devils in the Details: a Response to Kiverstein's 'Minimal Sense of Self, Temporality and the Brain'. Psyche, 15 (1), pp. 75-81. http://www.theassc.org/vol_15_no_1_2009
Abstract While remaining in broad agreement with the overall position developed and defended by Kiverstein, I identify and discuss what I take to be a number of problems with the details of the argument. These concern (a) the claim that a certain temporal structure to conscious experience is necessary for there to be a minimal sense of self, (b) the alleged ubiquitous presence in experience of a minimal sense of self, and (c) the claim that the distinction between the constitutive background conditions and the core realiser of a given experience is ultimately unsustainable.
Keywords self; consciousness; Moral education; Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951; Consciousness; Philosophy