Article
Details
Citation
Cruft R (2006) Against Individualistic Justifications of Property Rights. Utilitas, 18 (2), pp. 154-172. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820806001968
Abstract
In this article I argue that, despite the views of such theorists as Locke, Hart and Raz, most of a person's property rights cannot be individualistically justified. Instead most property rights, if justified at all, must be justified on non-individualistic (e.g. consequentialist) grounds. This, I suggest, implies that most property rights cannot be morally fundamental ‘human rights’.
Keywords
; Human rights; Right of property; Intellectual property Philosophy
Journal
Utilitas: Volume 18, Issue 2
Status | Published |
---|---|
Publication date | 30/06/2006 |
Publication date online | 19/05/2006 |
URL | http://hdl.handle.net/1893/1542 |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
ISSN | 0953-8208 |
People (1)
Professor, Philosophy