Working Paper

Can lobbying encourage abatement? Designing a new policy instrument

Details

Citation

Lange I & Polborn S (2012) Can lobbying encourage abatement? Designing a new policy instrument. Stirling Economics Discussion Paper 2012-03.

Abstract
Taking a political economy perspective this paper proposes an alternative carbon abatement policy instrument with significant cant advantages over existing policy instruments. The key feature of the proposed carbon securities is that they entitle their owners to a fi xed proportion of ex ante unknown total emis-sions. The total level of carbon emissions is set by the political process after the carbon securities have been sold. A key benefit of the proposed carbon security is that it creates a group of stakeholders, whose interest is for a smaller level of emissions and which competes with industries that consume signifi cant amounts of carbon-based energy. The advantages over existing policy tools include an equilibrium carbon price closer to the level preferred by voters and a more predictable environmental policy in the presence of either climate or political uncertainty. (JEL: D72, Q54, Q58)

Keywords
Lobbying; climate policy; Lobbying; Environmental policy Great Britain; Carbon dioxide Environmental aspects Great Britain

JEL codes

  • D72: Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • Q54: Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
  • Q58: Environmental Economics: Government Policy

StatusUnpublished
Title of seriesStirling Economics Discussion Paper 2012-03
URLhttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/3722