Article

Judgment and the identity theory of truth

Citation

Johnston C (2013) Judgment and the identity theory of truth. Philosophical Studies, 166 (2), pp. 381-397. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0046-x

Abstract
The identity theory of truth takes on different forms depending on whether it is combined with a dual relation or a multiple relation theory of judgment. This paper argues that there are two significant problems for the dual relation identity theorist regarding thought's answerability to reality, neither of which takes a grip on the multiple relation identity theory.

Keywords
Judgment; Truth; Multiple relation theory of judgment; Identity theory of truth

Journal
Philosophical Studies: Volume 166, Issue 2

StatusPublished
FundersArts and Humanities Research Council
Publication date30/11/2013
Publication date online31/10/2012
URLhttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/11406
PublisherSpringer
ISSN0554-0739