Árnadóttir ST & Crane T (2013) There is no Exclusion Problem. In: Gibb S, Lowe E & Ingthorsson R (eds.) Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 248-266. http://global.oup.com/academic/product/mental-causation-and-ontology-9780199603770;jsessionid=38423B8FC57B6FA0E5996F76C2EFF3CA?cc=gb〈=en&
First paragraph: Many philosophers want to say both that everything is determined by the physical and subject to physical laws and principles, and that certain mental entities cannot be identified with any physical entities. The problem of mental causation is to make these two assumptions compatible with the causal efficacy of the mental. The concern is that this physicalist picture of the world leaves no space for the causal efficacy of anything non-physical. The physical, as it is sometimes said, excludes anything nonphysical from doing causal work.