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Article

Meaning, Justification, and 'Primitive Normativity'

Citation
Haddock A (2011) Meaning, Justification, and 'Primitive Normativity'. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 86 (1), pp. 147-174. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2012.00212.x

Abstract
I critically discuss two claims which Hannah Ginsborg makes on behalf of her account of meaning in terms of ‘primitive normativity'(2011; 2012): first, that it avoids the sceptical regress articulated by Kripke's Wittgenstein; second, that it makes sense of the thought-central to Kripke's Wittgenstein-that ‘meaning is normative', in a way which shows this thought not only to be immune from recent criticisms but also to undermine reductively naturalistic theories of content. In the course of the discussion, I consider and attempt to shed light on a number of issues: the structure of the sceptical regress; the content of the thought that ‘meaning is normative', and its force against reductive theories; the connection between meaning and justification; and the notion of ‘primitive normativity'.

Keywords
Rule-following; Kripke; meaning; "primitive normativity"

Journal
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume: Volume 86, Issue 1

StatusPublished
Author(s)Haddock, Adrian
Publication date30/06/2011
Publication date online06/2011
Date accepted by journal21/12/2011
URLhttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/19291
PublisherWiley-Blackwell for the Aristotelian Society
ISSN0309-7013
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