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Article

Not every truth has a truthmaker

Citation
Milne P (2005) Not every truth has a truthmaker. Analysis, 65 (287), pp. 221-224. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8284.2005.00553.x

Abstract
First paragraph: Truthmaker theory maintains that for every truth there is something, some thing, some entity, that makes it true. Balking at the prospect that logical truths are made true by any particular thing, a consequence that may in fact be hard to avoid (see Restall 1996, Read 2000), this principle of truthmaking is sometimes restricted to (logically) contingent truths. I aim to show that even in its restricted form, the principle is provably false.

Journal
Analysis: Volume 65, Issue 287

StatusPublished
Author(s)Milne, Peter
Publication date31/07/2005
URLhttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/19463
PublisherWiley-Blackwell
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