Ebert P (2016) Frege on Sense Identity, Basic Law V, and Analysis. Philosophia Mathematica, 24 (1), pp. 9-29. http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/10/08/philmat.nkv032; https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkv032
The paper challenges a widely held interpretation of Frege's conception of logic on which the constituent clauses of basic law V have the same sense. I argue against this interpretation by first carefully looking at the development of Frege's thoughts in Grundlagen with respect to the status of abstraction principles. In doing so, I put forth a new interpretation of Grundlagen §64 and Frege's idea of ‘recarving of content’. I then argue that there is strong evidence in Grundgesetze that Frege did not hold the relevant sense-identity claim regarding basic law V.
Philosophia Mathematica: Volume 24, Issue 1