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Article

Corporate Ownership, Control, and Firm Performance: Evidence from a Nascent and Unregulated Market

Citation
Acheson G, Campbell G, Turner JD & Vanteeva N (2016) Corporate Ownership, Control, and Firm Performance: Evidence from a Nascent and Unregulated Market. Journal of Economic History, 76 (1), pp. 1-40. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050716000450

Abstract
Scholars have long debated whether ownership matters for firm performance. The standard view regarding Victorian Britain is that family-controlled companies had a detrimental effect on performance. In this article, we examine this view using a hand-collected corporate ownership dataset. Our main finding is that it was not necessarily the broad structure of corporate ownership that mattered for performance, but whether family blockholders had a governance role. Large active blockholders tended to increase operating performance, implying that they reduced managerial expropriation. Contrastingly, we find that directors who were independent of large owners were more likely to increase shareholder value.

Journal
Journal of Economic History: Volume 76, Issue 1

StatusPublished
Author(s)Acheson, Graeme; Campbell, Gareth; Turner, John D; Vanteeva, Nadia
Publication date31/03/2016
Publication date online25/02/2016
URLhttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/22967
PublisherCambridge University Press for the Economic History Association
ISSN0022-0507
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