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Idealization, Justice, and the Form of Practical Reason

Hope S (2016) Idealization, Justice, and the Form of Practical Reason. Social Philosophy and Policy, 33 (1-2), pp. 372-392.

First paragraph: In this paper I argue for three claims. First, the question of which, if any, idealizations are justifiable in philosophical reflection on morality and justice cannot be separated from the question of what the appropriate form of reflection is. My second claim, invoking the ancient distinction between the forms of practical and theoretical reason, is that the appropriate form of reflection on standards of justice and morality is practical rather than theoretical. My third claim is that the form of practical reason cannot support many of the idealizations typically deployed in modern moral and political philosophy.

Social Philosophy and Policy: Volume 33, Issue 1-2

Author(s)Hope, Simon
Publication date31/12/2016
Publication date online07/12/2016
Date accepted by journal12/05/2016
PublisherCambridge University Press
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