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Article

Idealization, Justice, and the Form of Practical Reason

Citation
Hope S (2016) Idealization, Justice, and the Form of Practical Reason. Social Philosophy and Policy, 33 (1-2), pp. 372-392. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000224

Abstract
First paragraph: In this paper I argue for three claims. First, the question of which, if any, idealizations are justifiable in philosophical reflection on morality and justice cannot be separated from the question of what the appropriate form of reflection is. My second claim, invoking the ancient distinction between the forms of practical and theoretical reason, is that the appropriate form of reflection on standards of justice and morality is practical rather than theoretical. My third claim is that the form of practical reason cannot support many of the idealizations typically deployed in modern moral and political philosophy.

Journal
Social Philosophy and Policy: Volume 33, Issue 1-2

StatusPublished
Author(s)Hope, Simon
Publication date31/12/2016
Publication date online07/12/2016
Date accepted by journal12/05/2016
URLhttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/23863
PublisherCambridge University Press
ISSN0265-0525
eISSN1471-6437
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