On Extended Rationality


Millar A (2017) On Extended Rationality. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 7 (4), pp. 235-245.

The discussion highlights the need to distinguish between perceptions and the experiences implicated by perceptions, noting that Coliva’s framework makes perception irrelevant to justified belief, except for being the contingent means by which we are furnished with experiences that are the real source of justified belief. It then addresses two issues concerning the problem of cognitive locality. The problem concerns what enables us rationally to suppose that our perceptual experiences mostly put us in touch with reality. The issues addressed are: (1) whether, assuming that there is a problem of cognitive locality, Coliva’s Moderate position adequately addresses it; and (2) whether Coliva gives us enough to make sense of the claim, central to the Moderate position, that certain background presuppositions are constitutive of empirical rationality.

justified belief; perceptual experience; perception; rationality; cognitive locality

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism: Volume 7, Issue 4

Publication date31/12/2017