Rights, Positivism, and the Vice of Self-Puffery: Why Kramer’s Interest Theory is Nearly Right
Cruft R (2022) Rights, Positivism, and the Vice of Self-Puffery: Why Kramer’s Interest Theory is Nearly Right. In: McBride M & Kurki V (eds.) Without Trimmings: The Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy of Matthew Kramer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 37-C2.N39. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868866.003.0002
Kramer’s Interest Theory of rights is inconsistent with the spirit of his legal positivism, this chapter argues, but seems nonetheless nearly correct as a necessary condition on morally justified rights: it is hard to come up with morally justified rights that fail to satisfy his theory. This chapter explains why: morally justified rights that fail to fit Kramer’s theory license right-holders to engage in a morally vicious form of self-puffery, and there are rarely good reasons to create rights licensing this vice.
Matthew Kramer; legal philosophy; political philosophy; ethics; metaethics
|Publisher||Oxford University Press|
|Place of publication||Oxford|