Frege, the self-consciousness of judgement, and the indefinability of truth

Citation

Johnston C (2021) Frege, the self-consciousness of judgement, and the indefinability of truth. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 29 (6), pp. 1124-1143. https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2021.1910484

Abstract
Frege characterizes judgement as the acknowledgement of the truth of a thought, appearing thereby to rule out false judgement. First in this paper I explain Frege’s characterization so that it does not have this consequence. Frege is not saying that for a subject S to judge that p is for S to acknowledge the truth of the thought that p. Rather, he is articulating judgement’s nature within self-consciousness. From within, to judge means to acknowledge a truth. Second, I suggest that this articulation is centrally operative in Frege’s argument for the indefinability of truth. As Frege argues, it follows from judgement’s self-consciousness that truth is indefinable.

Keywords
Frege; judgement; indefinability of truth; inference; self-consciousness

Journal
British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume 29, Issue 6

People

Dr Colin Johnston

Senior Lecturer, Philosophy