II. European Court of Justice and Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters

Citation

Beaumont P (1997) II. European Court of Justice and Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 46 (1), pp. 205-212. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002058930006019X

Abstract
In May 1995 the Court of Justice published' its initial contribution to the debate surrounding the intergovernmental conference (IGC) which officially got under way in March 1996. The court opposed any immediate reform in the judicial architecture of the Community although it did not rule out the possibility of the future establishment of specialist chambers within the Court of First Instance or even of specialised Community courts. Not surprisingly, the Court of First Instance in its contribution to the IGC rejected specialised Community courts but did not oppose the setting up of specialised chambers within itself. The Court of First Instance wanted more judges in that Court and advocated the creation of a new position called "assistant rapporteur". This person would be a specialist in a particular area, would draft the Court's judgment and, unlike legal secretaries, would be present at the Court's deliberations. The Court of Justice favours strengthening its independence by having the right to amend its own Rules of Procedure without the approval of the Council and by not opposing suggestions that a judge's term of office be extended from six to nine years but made non-renewable. The latter reform would put judges in a comparable position to members of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, who will serve for non-renewable eight-year terms of office.' The Court of First Instance opposed making j udicial appointments non-renewable. A further split between the two Courts was evident in their attitude to the possibility of members of the European Parliament being empowered to scrutinise the appointment of judges to the two Courts. The Court of Justice opposes it as a threat to its judicial independence but the Court of First Instance thinks that certain questions could be asked of judicial nominees, e.g. about their qualifications for the job. The Court of Justice was bold enough to comment on a few of the substantive aspects of its jurisdiction. It firmly opposed any change to the current position under Article 177oftheEC Treaty whereby all national courts and tribunals can refer questions of Community law to the Court of Justice (not to the Court of First Instance). Although the Court of Justice created locus standi under Article 173 of the EEC Treaty for the European Parliament to defend its prerogatives, the then text gave no express standing to the Parliament; it expressed doubts to the IGC about granting the European Parliament unlimited locus standi (currently reserved for the Commission, Council and member States). The Court, in a similar vein, suggested that the European Parliament should settle these disputes and those concerning international agreements at a political level rather than using Article 173 or being able to request an opinion under Article 228 of the EC Treaty. The Court of Justice voiced concerns about whether the present restrictive locus standi rules under Article 173 for natural and legal persons are sufficient to protect their fundamental human rights. Perhaps this is a sign that the Court of Justice recognises that it is for the member States to alter Article 173 at an IGC rather than for the Court by creative rewriting of the Treaty. Finally, the Court advocated codifying and streamlining the constitutive Treaties of the European Union. This should indeed be a priority of the IGC.

Keywords
Private International Law; EU Law

Journal
International and Comparative Law Quarterly: Volume 46, Issue 1

People

Professor Paul Beaumont

Professor of Private International Law, Law