Millar A (2001) Rationality and Higher-Order Intentionality. In: Walsh D (ed.) Naturalism, Evolution and Mind. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 49. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 179-198. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511563843.009
The article endorses the rationality thesis--that the possession of propositional attitudes is inextricably tied to rationality--and argues that subjects of such attitudes must be capable of deliberative thinking. In the theoretical sphere that is thinking as to whether some proposition is true. In the practical sphere it is evaluating possible actions in the light of reasons for or against performing them. This marks a contrast with the mentality of nonhuman animals. The emerging perspective is illustrated by consideration of intention and autobiographical memory.
animal thinking; deliberative thinking; intentionality; propositional attitudes; reasons
|Title of series||Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements|
|Number in series||49|
|Publisher||Cambridge University Press|
|Place of publication||Cambridge, UK|
|ISSN of series||1358-2461|