Article

Registered replication report: Rand, Greene and Nowak (2012)

Citation

Bouwmeester S, Verkoeijen P, Aczel B, Barbosa F, Bègue L, Brañas-Garza P, Chmura T, Cornelissen G, Døssing F, Espín A, Evans A, Ferreira-Santos F, Fiedler S, Flegr J & Wollbrant C (2017) Registered replication report: Rand, Greene and Nowak (2012). Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12 (3), pp. 527-542. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617693624

Abstract
In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation

Keywords
cooperation; social heuristic hypothesis; decision making; economic games; social psychology; replication

Notes
Additional co-authors: Minou Ghaffari, Andreas Glöckner, Timo Goeschl, Lisa Guo, Oliver P Hauser, Roberto Hernan-Gonzalez, Anthony Herrero, Zachary Horne, Petr Houdek, Magnus Johannesson, Lina Koppel, Praveen Kujal, Tei Laine, Johannes Lohse, Eva C Martins, Carlos Mauro, Dorothee Mischkowski, Sumitava Mukherjee, Kristian Ove R Myrseth, Daniel Navarro-Martínez, Tess M S Neal, Julie Novakova, Roger Pagà, Taigo O Paiva, Bence Palfi, Marco Piovesan, Rima-Maria Rahal, Erika Salomon, Narayanan Srinivasan, Ajita Srivastava, Barnabas Szaszi, Aba Szollosi, Karoline Ø Thor, Gustav Tinghög, Jennifer S Trueblood, Jay J Van Bavel, Anna E van ‘t Veer, Daniel Västfjäll, Megan Warner, Erik Wengström, Julian Wills

Journal
Perspectives on Psychological Science: Volume 12, Issue 3

StatusPublished
Publication date31/05/2017
Publication date online31/03/2017
Date accepted by journal01/03/2017
URLhttp://hdl.handle.net/1893/28525
ISSN1745-6916
eISSN 1745-6924