

The Impossible Mission: Global Justice  
Movement Against Transnational Organized  
Crime

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## Abstract

This article argues that the best counterattack against globally oriented transnational organized crime (TOC) is by a global response. The contribution of participating states and the creation of a collective identity against TOC are both necessary. This creation would be more effective through transnational social movements. Therefore, activating the global justice movement (GJM) against TOC would be a significant achievement. This has not yet taken place for both structural and ideological reasons which are on the surface quite rational. If GJM activists create a more unified movement, however, and adhere more strictly to non-violence as have other social movements like the Libera anti-Mafia association of Italy and Flare Network of Europe, there is potential for convergence.

**KEYWORDS:** global justice movement, globalization, transnational organized crime, social movement

## INTRODUCTION

Two significant concepts in recent world politics, the global justice movement (GJM) and transnational organized crime (TOC), may not initially seem relevant to one another. However, these two concepts have significant commonalities and overlaps.

After the 1970s, new social movements led to the current era of mobilization, one that differed from the Old Labor movement and its materialistic approach. The agenda of this new social movement has been dominated by the considerations of environmental protection, gender equality, respect for identities and multicultural formations (della Porta, 2007, p. 6). This new movement also brought about the emergence of GJM in the 1990s. GJM and its actors which, in fact, do not reject the Old Labor movement ideologies but additionally encompasses issues such as social justice, social security, equal economic opportunity, transparency, and solidarity, and its fundamental principles are similar to those of the feminist, environmental and anti-war movements (Moghadam, 2008; Dalton 1994; Lynch, 1999). GJM basically rejects, in principle, neo-liberal globalization, an ideology by which the world is dominated by a few major actors/states, multinational companies, and international organizations, which are perceived as the source of spreading “evil” and represent the “antagonist” of GJM activists.

Before making a comparison and analyzing the interactions between GJM and TOC, it is crucial to comprehend what we should understand when we talk about TOC since there is more than one definition. The definition of organized crime has been ambiguous and complex (Paoli, 2002; Fickenaue, 2005). The main distinction is between “organized crime group” and “organized crime” in which the latter is more regarded mafia-type crime (Hagan, 2005). Accordingly, Varese (2001: 4) wrote that: “by organized crime we do not mean simply ‘crime that is organized.’ Three burglars, who get together and plan a robbery, do not qualify as an organized criminal group (OCG). An OCG seeks ‘to govern’ the underworld.” Our definition of organized crime is in line with the Varese’s. The criminal organization governs the underworld through certain type of crimes such as human and drug trafficking, sex trafficking, extortion and arm trafficking. The illicit profits that are gained through these activities are managed with a set of methods by the members of the underworld. More to the point, transnational organized crime occurs when those activities utilize the profits of the organized crime groups in more than one country within a system of networks.

Transnational has been added to the concept of organized crime due to its difference from traditional methods of the mafia groups and its activities in more than one country (Mueller, 1998). The phrase has been popular in recent decades

because of globalization, which suggests flexibility in the functions of organized crime and the extension its networks outside one country.

In contrast to GJM, TOC uses any opportunity for illegal profit through exploiting resources that have been the foundational motivations of GJM. At this point, a paradox emerges: why does GJM explicitly target states and international institutions while neglecting TOC, which harm the principles and motivations of GJM to a similar extent. The disinterest of GJM activists in TOC is rational and strongly related with the priorities and perceptions of the GJM activists who target the roots of the problems rather than side effects of it such as TOC.

Mobilizing GJM against TOC seems to be an impossible mission. Ideally, GJM would oppose TOC for several reasons. First, TOC targets the ideals and values that GJM activists fight for, yet GJM more intensely focuses on states, and international organizations such as NATO, IMF, G-8, G-20, and multi-national corporations. GJM, flagging but global, has the potential to act against TOC in principle, but not in practice. Second, the ideologies that GJM defends concern the same resources and values that TOC exploits to make an illegal profit.

Our second point is that it important to direct GJM against TOC but it is not possible practically. However, it may be furthered with an increase in the quality of democratic foundations along three lines: public deliberation, public awareness and inclusive democracy. Moreover, transnational collective action can do much to realize improvements along these three lines.

Finally, our third point emphasizes that GJM should diversify its antagonists so as to participate in opposing TOC by using two ethical instruments: negative utilitarianism and moral universalism. Whereas the first activates material concerns, the second principle stimulates the moral concerns of the activists. These two different ethical principles are critical instruments that illustrate how activists could stand against TOC. Additionally, if GJM activists include TOC into their agenda, it may potentially help to increase the awareness about the harms of TOC and to open the gates for lending citizens' voices to deliberative democracy.

There are three basic limitations of GJM: (1) the structure of the movement (2) the method that the movement applies and (3) lack of counter policy production. All three mitigate its effectiveness. There are alternative methods to create transnational collective identity such as in the Italian case of Libera anti-Mafia association at the national level and the foundation of Flare Network in 2008 at the international level. These two organizations are models of civic struggle against organized crime which are free of three aforementioned limitations. Yet, these two organizations have not garnered the worldwide attention like GJM. More to the point, the Libera anti-Mafia association and Flare Network are significant institutions which attain fruitful results when these two institutions are not challenged by the limitations of GJM.

## STRUCTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL FORMATIONS OF THE GLOBAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT

Transnational collective action is mostly used as a term to signify “coordinated international campaigns on the part of networks of activists against international actors, other states, or international institutions” (della Porta and Tarrow, 2005, p. 7). Transnational collective action certainly has a significant place in activating the global justice movement to confront the ideologies of governments, international organizations and actors such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the WTO (World Trade Organization), the G-8 (The Group of 8), the G-20 (The Group of Twenty), the EU (European Union) NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), the IMF (International Monetary Fund), and multi-national corporations. The reason for such a confrontation is mainly the perception of these institutions or states as the main obstacles to attaining global justice as these institutions are perceived as the stimulators and shapers of wars, global warming, economic inequality, neo-liberal economies, and the current state of globalization (Pianta and Zola, 2005). The disunited and heterogeneous structure of GJM is not built on cohesive methods to realize its goals. However, in addition to its diverse subjects, various groups, and different methods, there are commonalities among each GJM actions. There have been greater numbers of GJM events all around the world. In the last two decades, they have become more crystallized. The heterogeneous and multi-layered structure of the GJM is demonstrated through four representative examples: the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, EZLN) in Mexico; the French Public Strikes; the Seattle protests against WTO summit, and G-8 protests in Genoa; the anti-war movement against the invasion of Iraq, anti-nuclear movement and the recent Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movements. They were briefly as follows:

In Chiapas, Mexico, the EZLN rebelled in 1994, and around 2,000 poor indigenous peasants occupied the towns in heights of Chiapas because of the huge economic and social difference between the rich and the poor. This movement was significant in terms of its bottom-up orientation and the direct action to change social inequality. In this regard, EZLN was opposed to neoliberal policies and NAFTA, which they thought harmed the lives of the peasants through free trade. The movement generated a substantial amount of propaganda because of their political communications, and managed to attract global attention (Harvey, 1998; Weatherby, 2000; Higgins, 2004).

The French Public strikes of November and December 1995 were one of the most significant landmarks in GJM. One of the largest social movements in France after the 1968 protest movements, they occurred against the new Juppé

government, which aimed to increase welfare cutbacks. The resistance resulted in victory and the government withdrew the proposals (Trat, 1996; Jenkins, 2000).

The Seattle protests were another turning point in the global justice movement. When the World Trade Organization (WTO) summit occurred in 1999 in Seattle, thousands of protestors had decided months earlier to protest it because of their alignment against economic globalization. More than 600 protesters were arrested by the end of the day (Solnit, Solnit and Mittal, 2009). Additionally, the G-8 summit in Genoa in June 2001 saw demonstrations by 300,000 people (della Porta and Diani, 2006).

The invasion of Iraq by the USA in 2003 succeeded in mobilizing people around the world against the war. (Callinicos, 2005).

The OWS began on 17<sup>th</sup> of September 2011 in Zuccotti Park near New York City's Wall Street. OWS emerged out with the recent worldwide economic crises which triggered dissent against the organization of the world economic system and the power of the hegemonic institutions and states. The Alliance for Global Justice (AFGJ) sponsored the OWS. Similarly to GJM, OWS has called for eliminating the current power of the hegemonic institutions. The most popular slogan of the OWS is: "We are the 99 percent." The slogan signifies the potential power of the movement through emphasizing its overwhelming majority. More importantly, OWS was not limited to New York. Shortly after its first protest in September, OWS managed to mobilize thousands of people in the USA and organized a big social protest on 15<sup>th</sup> of October in over 900 cities around the world. In many cases, the local authorities reacted heavily. In this respect, Graeber (2011) has suggested a link between OWS and anarchism.

Apart from these significant representations of GJM actions, organizations have emerged which work with multiple issues: for example, the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens, ATTAC, which was created in 1998 in France and now has branches in many countries, such as Germany, Canada, Italy and Lebanon. They defend the value of public goods and services and are not against globalization; rather, they seek global policies that promote social justice (Kolb 2005; Birchfield and Freyberg-Inan, 2004).

Multiple GJM actions illustrate that the activists have both commonalities and differences. GJM is far from being a united and homogenous structure, and has both local and global aspects. The commonalities of GJM can be summarized in six points. First, it is directed against state or international organizations. Second, protesting is the common action to demonstrate dissent. Third, the activists primarily blame the macro system rather than the micro actors. Fourth, such blame is ascribed to the injustice of the current system of globalization where the other micro actors such as the politicians or corrupted bureaucrats take the advantage of this international capitalist system. Fifth, the activists have clear targets which aim to change the macro/social system or abolish certain policies.

Finally, the activists take their action at the local level but aim to attract global attention. For instance, the protest generally occur in the places where the activists live or the antagonists are active but the struggle of the activists try to take the attention globally through their strikes, resistance, and the mass social protests which are instrumental to show their resilience.

As to differences, these may be summarized in five points. First, even though the activists have clear main aims, there is no structured policy designed step by step to realize their main goal. Second, the method that the activists use during the protests and resistance illustrate either violent or non-violent measures which would seem to increase the heterogeneity among the GJM activists. Third, the actors may belong to different ages, gender or political groups. Fourth, GJM activists' focus on issues changes according to the activists' ideological priorities, such as social justice, anti-war activism, environmentalism or multiple ideologies. Finally, GJM protests in the world and various actions are not coordinated from just one center in a systematic manner but rather each movement is mainly independent even if each has its own organization (Della Porta and Mosca, 2005).

These commonalities and differences make GJM difficult to categorize as just one movement; rather it is a "movement of movements." Although, GJM activists have common features and ideological approaches in favor of a "better world," there are also distinctions which make GJM activists ineffective against other actors who attack against their values and motivations, such as TOC. Firstly, GJM activists diversify in the structure of the movement and secondly in the priority of ideologies. Therefore, structural and ideological diversifications restrain GJM activists from taking action.

#### THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE ACTION AGAINST TOC

It is important to create transnational collective action against TOC because it is dysfunctional and a hindrance to governance.

States have attacked organized crime, but they do the most harm to democracies through the "totalitarian control of the territory...privatization of the public – destructing civil society." (Armao, 2003, p. 33). Moreover, the failure of the states to provide security, justice and solidarity motivates criminal groups to perform their illegal activities (Skaperdas, 2001; Sung, 2004). Most people fight against TOC by means of public deliberation, awareness, and inclusive democracy. These three means, which are related to democracy, explain why civil society activities become so crucial in increasing the effectiveness of the struggle to fight against TOC. Such support from the civil society may increase the ability of the public to deliberate and to control, that is, to take a watchdog position, as regards the government's anti-transparent activities, corruption cases and collusion of the politicians with the organized crime groups. Non-governmental

organizations may also play a role in increasing public awareness by creating social networks, using mass media tools and mobilizing citizens through demonstrations. And civil society may stimulate the democratic quality in the countries through civic participation, coalition with the policymakers that may present fresh and bottom-up policy designs to the politicians. Such a contribution to administrative and democratic bodies may help to enhance inclusive democracy.

However, there is still a disputable point in defining GJM as a civil society. There are diverse definitions of the civil society. The most well known according to Anheier (2004: 22), "civil society is the sphere of institutions, organizations and individuals located among the family, the state and the market, in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests." Given this, we can define GJM as a civil society. However, its structural features push GJM in the direction of being a heterogeneous social movement.

States naturally display more powerful commitments in this fight as the legal representatives of their societies. For instance, there was the convention signed in 2000 at Palermo. The convention contained two protocols (1) Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (2) Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. By October 2009, it was signed by 117 countries. In addition to the recent collaboration of the states against organized crime, such collaborations within civil society occurred in 1972. The establishment of The Alliance of NGOs on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice with its 35 members is another good example of civic initiative against organized crime. Additionally, the UNCAC Coalition, a global civil society network, was established in 2003. State collaboration has brought a much faster response to transnational organized crime than the collaboration of non-state actors because of legal power. However, this has been diminished by official corruption and the collusion of politicians with organized criminals which has limited the effectiveness of the Palermo Convention.

Creating a collective identity among separate organizations within GJM contains significant opportunities through creating collective identity to realize their goals, especially regarding governmental co-operation (della Porta, 2007). Moreover, social movements carry the potential for resistance against corruption in their own countries, collusion between the politicians and organized criminal groups or on the implementation of those binding legal documents like constitution or international agreements for a better society. Building such a collective identity is not only defending one's own resources but also may help to improve deliberative democracies, first, at the national level and, second, at international level after gaining such a collective identity, leading to unification and mobilization against (transnational) organized crime.

Global social movements comprise actors who have social networks to delineate their causes and who take action against more than one state or international governmental organization (della Porta 2007, p. 5). Additionally, the global social movement requires “the development of a discourse that identifies both a common identity—the ‘us’—and the target of the protest—the ‘other’—at the transnational level” (della Porta 2007, p. 7). In this context, the creation of the movement with a collective identity to protect the resources of countries and the world may perceive TOC as “the other,” which may help to counteract popular silence against exploitation.

Therefore if GJM activists mobilize themselves to combat TOC, this could be an opportunity both to hinder TOC and to establish deliberative democracy. Yet GJM activists have been more willing to concrete targets like states or international organizations which are the “evil producers” rather than the TOC which is one of the outcomes of those “evil producers.” Some have even gone so far as to argue that state policies cause more harm than homicides and assaults (Reiman, 1995). More to the point, globalization has given greater opportunities for TOC groups (Nelken, 1997; Edwards and Gill, 2003).

#### INTERSECTIONS IN A PARADOX: GLOBAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME?

As noted, GJM and TOC are interested in the same issues; in principle, this potentially GJM activists should attack TOC. Why not in practice? The new social movements have gathered primarily around values rather than material benefits, that is to say, “a new life concept” (Melluci, 1996). Certainly, this new concept is not totally independent from that of older movements, where materialistic values play a dominant role, e.g., labor rights after the liberalization of markets (Ceri, 2003; della Porta, 2007). On the other hand, GJM is concerned with cultural rights, gender differences, and environmental issues at both national and international levels. Paradoxically, the multifaceted structure and interests of GJM on multiple issues have led it to share similar features with TOC, which focuses on multiple sectors, such as eco-crime, money laundering, human trafficking, arms and drug trafficking, extortion and manipulating markets so as to increase their illegal profits with the help of their transnational networks around the world.

Such a similarity allows GJM and TOC to act in the same arenas despite having opposing goals. For instance, the women’s rights, violence against women, identity and economic equality with respect to maternity leave rights fall in the scope of GJM, which is one of the main issues covered in the World Social Forum (WSF) (Stienstra, 2000; Vargas, 2003; Antrobus, 2004). On the other hand, sex trafficking is one of the most profitable businesses, generating millions of dollars

for different organized crime groups around the world, with cooperation among them. Young women and even children at a very early age have been victims of the organized crime groups for sex trafficking, which is drawing the attention of the public in terms of moral concern and social deprivation. (Taylor and Jamieson, 1999; Hughes, 2000; Ronald, 2005; Witzer, 2005)

Environmental issues, particularly regarding sustainable development, nuclear protests, and climate change are major subjects that GJM focuses on (Hayden, 2005; Doyle and McEachern, 2008). GJM activists demonstrate consistent resistance to environmental exploitation (Foster, 1998). In contrast, the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen displayed how the states are still far from co-operating in the multiple alarming areas of the environment. As with GJM activists, the environment is one of the most suitable areas to be exploited for organized crime groups as well. While GJM activists demonstrate for the protection of the environment against the states, different organized criminal groups throughout the world commit eco-crimes in multiple areas, such as illegal wildlife trade, illegal logging, the smuggling of ozone-depleting substances (ODS) and other crimes that exploit the environment and its resources for illegal profit-making, such as the illegal waste trafficking business in Italy (Massari and Monzini, 2004) or the illegal killing of over 4,000 elephants in South African states (CITES, 2004). Therefore, the environment represents one of the target points that are perceived as being relatively easier and more risk free by the transnational and environmental organized criminal groups (Hyatt and Trexler, 1996). In this way, TOC becomes a major threat to the eco-system and to human health.

Social justice, social security, economic justice and equal opportunity to work are the concepts that constitute the basic foundations of global justice. These terms seek equal opportunity for everyone in terms of economic prosperity and the protection of basic human rights, which are perceived as important for solidarity in the society (Barry, 2005). On the other hand, TOC traditionally targets the economic sphere such as money laundering, which certainly makes the agenda of TOC feasible following recent technological developments (Beare, 2003; Ridley, 2008). Second, the trade in counterfeit goods has grown much more quickly than legal trade since the 1990s. For instance, from 2007 to 2008, just in one year, it increased by 14% (Interpol, 2008). Third, child labor, human trafficking, which is called modern-day slavery, and drug trafficking have been increasing dramatically. Through deception and coercion, the victims have been the targets of TOC. Human trafficking is forbidden by international law, but TOC groups makes 138 billion US dollars every year from it (Interpol, 2008; Finckenauer, 2008; Siegel, 2008). Finally, stolen goods and other illegal goods, or legal goods obtained through illegal methods, may become a profitable sector for different organized crime rings (Albenese, Das Verma, 2003). In this context, the

Russian Mafia and its black market provide a good example of such profitability, especially given the increase of illegal goods prices in the black market (Varese, 2001; Finckenauer, 2004)

GJM is defined as a bottom-up movement that first takes its power by spreading its ideologies among ordinary people, making its position legitimate by communicating just principles to a wide audience with the aim of changing the world system dominated by the hierarchical powers who are minority in the number but govern the majority (Fishman and Scott, 2006; Ferguson and Lavalette, 2005; Brock, 2009). Additionally, GJM cannot be categorized simply as an anti-global network. In fact, some GJM organizations, such as ATTAC, explicitly reported that they are not against globalization but that they dream of a different globalization. Such a globalization should target solidarity and cosmopolitanism in society so as to attain moral economic, social and political inclusiveness among and within societies and peoples. The popular phrase “Another world is possible” follows this ideology in the World Social Forums as well as the popular slogan “You are G-8, we are 6 billion” after G8 meetings in Genoa, 2001 (della Porta and Reiter, 2002, p. 105; della Porta et al., 2006). In the last two decades, globalization has affected the whole world in both positive and negative ways. Undoubtedly, TOC has increased its impact through more flexible means of crossing borders and more stable international networks, which can be called “global bads” (Stanislwaski, 2004). Globalization spread much faster than the ability to regulate it. The lack of control and the deficit of global governance have empowered several sectors, especially in cybercrime (UNODC, 2010).

Anti-war groups constitute one of the basic principles of GJM, which is based on rejecting any power-based hegemonic invasion among states in the name of any concerns of the states. For instance, recently, the movement against the Iraq War mobilized 2.5 million people in Rome, 250,000 people in Paris, 500,000 in Berlin, 1 million in Madrid, 1.3 million in Barcelona, 1.75 million in London and even 500,000 in East Manhattan, not long after the 9/11 events (Tarrow and della Porta, 2005, p. 227). In contrast to GJM’s motivations, the same ideals, the war and tension within and between the states present opportunities and appropriate conditions for TOC groups to increase their profit margins through illegal arms trafficking to politically turbulent regions. For instance, organized crime groups take such opportunities in the exchange of arms and narcotics as in the case of the relationship between the IRA (Irish Republican Army) from Northern Ireland, ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna; Basque Homeland and Freedom) from the Basque region of Spain and the terrorist narcotics group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which provides weapons, training and technology exchange (Post, 2007, p. 158). Moreover, the European drug cartel

was dominated largely by the terrorist organization, PKK<sup>1</sup> (The Workers' Party of Kurdistan), and the PKK collaborated with other transnational organized groups in the exchange of drugs and arms such as the Calabrian mafia group 'Nrangheta and intensified its attacks on Turkish territories after the US invasion of Iraq (Lyubov and Ted, 2008).

GJM's ideology promotes a transparent society that is based on the justice principle. The transformation of institutions towards such a system should be "more transparent, more accountable, and more democratically contestable" (Cabrera, 2004, p. 2). These motivations should advance transparency, democracy and representatives (Taylor, 2004, p. 5). In this context, GJM targets cases of corruption that occur in governments and international institutions (Mason, 2005, p. 56). Different crime organizations infiltrate public institutions and collaborate with certain politicians to enhance and consolidate their power through public-sector contracts or real-estate activities under political protection. (Nelken and Levi, 1996, p. 6). Italy has been notable for its Clean Hands operation (Paoli, 2003; della Porta and Vannunci, 2003), as have other states such as Colombia (Lee III and Thoumi, 2004), Mexico (Pimentol, 2004), Russia and the Ukraine (Shelley, 2004), and Taiwan (Lo, 2004).

Human security has been the focus of efforts to improve development ethics by transforming social attitudes (Gasper and Truong, 2005). In this context, GJM aims at an ideal world definition, which encompasses trust and human safety. However, this definition does not apply to the top levels of society as with police states, authoritative democracies or protectionist states, based on laws to protect, first, the benefits of the state rather than those of its people. The gap between the functioning of the states' duties and the demands of its citizens has been growing alongside organized crime. States have begun losing their control over security and global organized crime has been the beneficiary. For instance, so-called private protection has been the alarming reality for many years in southern Italy (Gambetta, 1996), and the majority of shops in southern Italy continue paying *pizzo*: extortion money to the mafia groups (Forno and Gunnarson, 2009). Extortion has been a popular profit-making endeavor, but more importantly, it represents a signal to the local people of the authority of the organized crime on the local territories, not only in Italy, but also in other countries such as the Netherlands, where extortion was said to be paid by half the hotels and night clubs in Utrecht, and among ethnic organized crime over ethnic immigrants, such as Chinese gangs from Chinese restaurants and PKK from Kurdish/Turkish cafés and restaurants (Fijnaut et al., 1998). Even though the extortion problem in Utrecht was ultimately reduced, the Netherlands still plays an important role as a transition basement for the transnational organized crimes

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<sup>1</sup> The PKK is internationally listed as a terrorist organization by a number of states and international organizations, such as the US, the UN, NATO, and the EU.

which are especially functional in human, sex and drug (except soft drug) trafficking (Van de Bunt, 2004; Van de Bund and Kleemans 2006). Extortion remains a major problem in Russia (Voronin, 1997; Varese, 2001), China (Chin, 2000) and Colombia, where it involves oil companies (Holmes et al., 2008). Therefore, TOC may be seen as a kind of authoritarian regime, one that is unlike Fascism or Communism but is similar in that the victims are unable to protect themselves from their abusers (Shelley, 2010, p. 67).

Transnational organized crime has affected economic, social, political and environmental domains seriously; however, GJM activists appear to have little interest in transnational organized crime actively, in fact this should be the reverse, in principle, when we take into account their concerns for a just society.

#### NEGATIVE UTILITARIANISM AND MORAL UNIVERSALISM: CONCERNS AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

TOC endangers the values of humanity, and defies moral and material values. There are two ethical approaches to counter it: negative utilitarianism and moral universalism. There are also the concepts of “deactivated political opportunity” and “missed opportunity” which intersect both approaches and help to explain why it has proven difficult for GJM activists to take action against TOC.

Classical utilitarianism is based upon the importance of maximizing happiness. Unlike classical utilitarianism, negative utilitarianism embraces the minimizing of suffering and unhappiness. Negative utilitarianism essentially argues that minimizing suffering or evil should take precedence (Smart, 1989). Karl Popper has claimed that “human suffering makes a direct moral appeal for help, while there is no similar call to increase the happiness of a man who is doing well anyway” (Popper, 1950, p. 570-71). This point is still relevant in today’s world, which is under serious risk and a serious threat of war, massacre, starvation, and natural resource exploitation. Additionally, TOC has exacerbated and perpetrated all of these undesirable acts. Moreover, Popper has argued that “the principle that the fight against avoidable misery should be a recognized aim of public policy, while the increase of happiness should be left, in the main, to private initiative” (Popper, 1969, p. 345). Even though TOC poses serious risks to socio-economic life and basic security needs of the societies, it is not invincible; it is an avoidable misery, given the existence of necessary and consistent public responses to it from both state and non-state forces.

Negative utilitarianism is better suited than most idealist alternatives. For instance, transhumanism claims that its ultimate target is to enhance humanity and to prevent global catastrophic risks through technological development and transforming society to fight against disability, aging, diseases, nuclear danger, volcanic eruption and so on (Bostrom and Cirkovic, 2008, p. 1). Negative

utilitarianism, by contrast, would give priority to cultural transformation over technological ones. For example, as TOC affects individuals through youth unemployment and extortion, such as in southern Italy, which ends up with a double taxation of the citizens when the state is unable to protect its citizens, “extra-legal governance” comes to the fore (Gambetta, 1993, p. 16; Mignone, 2008, p. 96). Illegal immigration creates upheavals in addition to problems for the economy. These are material concerns at the same time, which have direct effects not only on the lives of the victims but also on all citizens because illegal immigrants fill undeclared and unregistered jobs, which enlarges the unofficial economies of the receiving countries. Additionally, it may negatively affect the distribution of income, thus reducing the income of low-skilled workers of the receiving countries like the U.S.A (Carbough 2008, p. 329). Economic disparity has also lead to a dramatic increase in sex trafficking. Some countries, like Thailand, depend on the sex industry, and Yakuza criminal organizations arrange sex tours for businessmen, especially from Asia, and export Thai women to Japan (Shelley, 2010, p. 46, 149). Finally, environmental crime in places such as Africa, Europe, the US and Asia jeopardizes human health and the environment.

TOC not only has enormous observable effects on the lives of all people, but also has an important role in non-observable areas like values. All human beings deserve to live with a certain degree of human dignity and a certain level of respect. Moral universalism has the potential to explore and activate the moral concerns of GJM because GJM basically refers to a moral standard that can be applicable to all humans without distinction. Moreover, moral universalism intersects with cosmopolitanism, which perceives all humans as having equal rights (Ulrich, 2006, p. 52). Accordingly, GJM joins basic principles of moral cosmopolitanism (Pojman, 2006, p. 67), as Kant proposed long ago.

Moral universalism and negative utilitarianism therefore are two significant approaches for understanding the potential relevance of GJM to TOC; now let us turn to the opportunities for mobilizing transnational movements. Even though there are discussions about the restrictions on political opportunity (Gamson and Meyer, 1996), there is consensus that political opportunities play a central role in social movements (Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1982; Meyer, 1994; Tarrow, 1994). Movements exist to make use of opportunities; however, at the same time, opportunities are not the sole reasons for mobilization (Meyer, 2004, p. 52). The potential for missed opportunities is great (Sawyers and Mayer, 1999). “If we want to understand the choices that activists make, we need to assess not only the resources available to groups of challengers, but also the available avenues for making claims” (Meyer, 2004, p. 50). GJM may pursue two different avenues to mobilize against TOC: moral and material.

## FROM THE LIMITATIONS OF THE GLOBAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT TO A NEW TYPE OF CIVIC ACTION AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME

Radical social movements have been perceived as a source of hope (Foran 2010). In this sense, GJM offers a good starting point so as to ameliorate those hard social problems through its global network. However, there are both internal and external limitations to the power of GJM: internally, they are: (1) the structure of the movement, (2) the method that the movement utilizes and (3) lack of a concrete and solid counter policy production.

First, the structure of the movement has increased the worries about the effectiveness of GJM. Even though GJM has a certain level of success in the mobilization of the thousands of people, the heterogeneous structure of GJM and its disorganization stand in the way of its effectiveness. Second, the method that GJM activists apply, such as violence, during their protests contradict the humanistic ideals for which GJM is fighting. The tendency to violence limits GJM's role in the prevention of crime and fighting against TOC at the moral level. Finally, the lack of counter-policy programs hinders the belief that GJM is the most appropriate social movement with its current structure to overcome the world's toughest problems.

Externally, there are also three sets of limitations: the manipulation of legal institutions and companies by organized crime groups; the related political-criminal nexus; and intra-organizational conflict among Mafia groups. First, organized crime groups have increased their influence by infiltrating the legal system either by establishing new companies or by creating a cartel type economic arrangement. This has been widely operative in Italy (Arlacchi, 1993), the USA (Gambetta and Reuter, 1995), Russia (Gerber, 2000), and the Netherlands (van Duyne, 1993). The infiltration of organized crime groups into legal economic life obfuscates the public perception of these groups. Second, the political-criminal nexus offers a safety net groups like the Mafia, which is based on mutual cooperation between the Mafiosi and politicians (Paoli, 1997; Godson, 2003; Cayli, 2010). The last external factor is the threat that organized criminals expose to the anti-Mafia actors when they challenge their social systems and organizations. This threat was popularized in the name of *omertà* in Italy which signifies that if one violates *omertà*, the punishment of that person is absolute and final. The creation of a network of fear basically aims to deter the anti-Mafia movement. The resistance against Mafia groups was limited until the last two decades in Southern Italy but this has since spread to places like Mexico, Colombia, Russia, China, and Taiwan.

Erasing external limitations is a more challenging task which needs collaborative policies between the state and non state forces whereas internal limitations can be overcome through activism. In this context, two anti-

Mafia/anti-organized crime organizations represent ideal models for GJM regarding how to eliminate internal limitations: Italy's Libera, and Europe's Flare Network.

Italy is one of the best-known countries for organized crime due to its notorious Mafia associations, and its successful anti-Mafia struggle. It is not surprising that the power of the Mafia, which first emerged in Sicily in the mid-nineteenth century, has become so institutionalized and diversified (Blok, 1974; Catanzaro, 1992; Stille, 1995). Anti-Mafia efforts did not emerge until the mid-twentieth century in Sicily (Santino, 2006) and their institutionalization did not take place until the early 1990s, shortly after the tragic assassinations of two anti-Mafia prosecutors in the summer of 1992: Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino. Currently, Libera is the largest anti-Mafia network in the nation which fights against the Mafia through activities in the areas of education, sport, public awareness, recycle of confiscated goods, as well as providing an extensive civil society network through Libera Informazione. Libera has collaborations with over 1,200 associations and schools in Italy and abroad. The model of the Libera has inspired others in Europe. For example, Flare (Freedom, legality and rights in Europe) was established in 2008. It is composed of 38 NGOs from Europe, Mediterranean countries, the Russian Federation, Caucasus and the Balkans. Flare's headquarters is in Turin and has branch offices in Belgium, Serbia and Ukraine. These two civil society initiatives, Libera and Flare, do not simply demonstrate the significance of social struggle but also, and more importantly, provide proof that a global network, to be successful, must appeal to the values of GJM yet do so in a more limited fashion and with some important distinctions.

Both Libera at the national level and Flare Network at the international level demonstrate that how two social movements can function better than a more broadly designed GJM in attaining its goals. Both Libera and the Flare network embrace a non-violent approach in their protests, which is different from some GJM activists. Indeed, both institutions exist to counteract the Mafia culture of violence. Moreover, both Libera and the Flare Network have offices, a central organizational body, and a set of rules governing their actions, as well as networks of volunteers. GJM has a much looser structure, no central body of governance, nor a set of clear rules.

Nevertheless, the serious limitations of GJM ought not to undermine the importance of the movement. Many thousands of people around the world are motivated by its basic principle: the desire for a just and better world. However, drawing from the experience of organizations like Libera and the Flare Network, GJM has the potential to evolve into a movement that brings about more concrete results. GJM can only serve as a role model of social mobilization if it changes its structure and mitigates ideological fragmentation.

## CONCLUSION

With its transnational networks and proposals for justice, GJM rightly deserves more attention as a social movement, but it focuses on a limited group of targets. Even though this article does not address the validity of GJM's opposition to states or international organizations, it puts forth the argument that GJM's disinterest toward TOC groups is a rationally oriented decision. In this regard, TOC represents only one negative side effect of the problem of global injustice rather than its origin. Ethical approaches—negative utilitarianism and moral universalism—provide a theoretical framework to demonstrate GJM's material and moral concerns that are under attack by TOC. Through these concerns, a counterattack against TOC is not likely to be facilitated by transnational movements such as GJM so the struggle against TOC will continue to remain at the state level.

There are also important limitations to recall. The mobilization of GJM against TOC does not guarantee that TOC can be defeated. "Movements are the product of more than opportunity; they represent the efforts of groups and individuals not only to take advantage of opportunity but also to alter the subsequent opportunity structure." (Meyer, 2004, p. 55). However, these opportunities neither create the social movement themselves nor guarantee their success. Thus, even though there are appropriate ethical reasons and political opportunities that push one to expect that GJM's confrontation against TOC would be possible, it has not been the case in practice because of GJM's heterogeneous structure and ideology. Moreover, confronting TOC is not the sole purview of GJM. Yet GJM may mobilize people against the effects of TOC and by increasing awareness of its harms and social costs.

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