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The British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons and the Cultures of the Cold War, 1957–64

Holger Nehring

This article compares the ways in which Cold War culture in general and 'nuclear culture' in particular framed British and West German anti-nuclear-weapons campaigns in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Rather than interpreting the movements as protests against nuclear weapons only, this article suggests that the movements mounted a more fundamental resistance against the Cold War's effects on international relations, politics and society. In order to express this resistance, the protesters in both countries revitalised very specific national protest traditions. In exploring the relationship between Cold War culture and political traditions, the article highlights the ambiguities of Cold War culture in Britain and West Germany.

This article aims to explore Cold War culture in general and 'nuclear culture' in particular by examining the protests against nuclear weapons in Britain and West Germany in the late 1950s and early 1960s. For the purposes of the article, 'culture' is conceptualised broadly as the pool of experiences out of which social actors supply themselves in order to endow their actions with meaning.[1] The article is, therefore, not concerned with cultural products, but with the interactions between social actions, politics and meaning. It is argued that the movements were protests against the Cold War in general and the effects the Cold War had (in the eyes of the protesters) on international relations, nation states, politics and society in particular. In order to make sense of the world around them, the protesters tapped different political traditions. But there was no agreement, even amongst the protesters in either country, about what meaning this resistance was supposed to have.

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Through its comparative perspective, the article makes two contributions to our understanding of Cold War culture. Firstly, it shows that the Cold War was also a 'civil war' fought within domestic societies. This is not yet taken seriously enough by historians of contemporary Britain. In his recent survey on the British nuclear war plans, Peter Hennessy argues that the Cold War was 'a specialists' confrontation, not a people's conflict'.[2] Hennessy's argument is representative of a widespread, albeit declining, perception amongst British contemporary historians that Britain's population was exempt from the domestic effects of the Cold War.[3]

Secondly, the article argues that to portray Cold War culture as monolithic is a misnomer. Instead, CND and its West German counterpart were more than mere reflections of 'nuclear culture' and of global fears of nuclear war.[4] There were various cultures of the Cold War within each movement. The very different cultural norms and values which preceded the Cold War and which influenced both movements are thrown into sharp relief.[5] Although the supporters of the protest movements were united in their desire to reach beyond the Cold War and to escape the shadow which the Bomb cast over British and West German culture, the forms in which they expressed their misgivings harked back to the pre-Cold War era. Nevertheless, although the cultural frameworks predated the Cold War, their meanings changed in the negotiations about meaning within the new Cold War context. Cold War culture thus appears not just a product of the Cold War, but rather as a result of the complex interplay between political and social traditions and the specific Cold War experiences of different groups within society.

An approach which tries to narrow everything down to Cold War experiences and uses 'culture' as a catch-all phrase should be avoided. Instead of talking about Cold War culture, we should discuss the manifold experiences and meanings of Cold War cultures which social actors discussed. The Cold War had profound effects on the ways in which different groups in British and West German society perceived processes of social change and their position within these processes. But Cold War culture was not monolithic in each country and across the world. It varied greatly along the lines of social groups, gender and nation. The argument will be developed in three steps. The first section will contextualise historically the Cold War cultures under discussion. The second part examines the different traditions which came together in protests against nuclear weapons and the way in which they related to the Cold War context. The third section briefly examines the impact of these traditions on key areas.

The British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons

The British and West German anti-nuclear-weapons movements of the late 1950s and the early 1960s not only stood out as the strongest of their kind in Western Europe but also mobilised considerable support by the standard of protest movements in general. In 1959, 20,000 to 25,000 people took part in the final rally of the second annual Easter March between the nuclear weapons establishment in Aldermaston, Berkshire, and central London. For 1960, the estimates for the final rally on Trafalgar Square vary

between 60,000 and 100,000 participants. In 1961, between about 40,000 and 50,000 people participated.[6] In the Federal Republic, the Easter Marches, founded after the British example, were similarly popular. In 1961, about 23,000 people participated in the final Easter March rally. By 1964, more than 100,000 in the whole of Germany took part. The Campaign against Atomic Death, which had been organised by the SPD and the trade unions in 1958–59, had mobilised more than 200,000 people across West Germany.[7]

Both the British and the West German movement started as protests against nuclear weapons tests and the radiation emanating from them in the mid-1950s. We should not, however, overlook the differences in emphasis between the movements. Most importantly, Great Britain was in control of nuclear weapons, while the Federal Republic had only just begun its efforts to acquire a nuclear deterrent. Yet, both movements were functionally equivalent, and they became more and more concerned with the same issue: nuclear disarmament in general. In Britain, the first protests against nuclear-bomb tests and bases took place in the early 1950s, with the pacifist Peace Pledge Union at its centre. 1957 saw the formation of two more new bodies. The Direct Action Committee (DAC) was formed to protest against British H-bomb tests in the Pacific with Greenpeace-like tactics; its activities ran parallel to those of the more moderate National Committee for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests (NCANWT), formed in February 1957. This Committee merged into the newly founded Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in early 1958. CND campaigned for a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament. In autumn 1960, a more radical group around the philosopher Bertrand Russell and his assistant Ralph Schoenman left CND and founded the Committee of 100.[8]

In West Germany, public awareness of the dangers of nuclear weapons began at around the same time as in Britain, although organisations were formed much later. As in Britain, the West German movement had its roots in concerns about the dangers of nuclear-weapons tests. While these sentiments had been translated into protests in Britain in the mid-1950s, no major protests emerged in West Germany at this time. This was primarily due to the staunchly anti-communist climate in the Federal Republic. Although anti-communism permeated both the British and the West German political cultures, it had a more immediate importance in the Federal Republic. Due to division and competition between the two German states, the 'Cold Civil War' drew the boundaries of the say-able and the do-able much more clearly there than it did in Britain.[9] In early 1958, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the trade unions launched the Campaign against Atomic Death when the Adenauer government planned to acquire nuclear-capable equipment for the German Army. A new movement emerged after the SPD had abandoned the Campaign in the wake of their programmatic changes.[10] In 1960, a small group of Hamburg Quakers and their supporters who had imported the Easter March from Britain marched for the first time in northern Germany. From 1961, there were marches all over the country. In September 1962, the movement changed its name to Easter Marches of Atomic Weapons Opponents – Campaign for Disarmament.[11] The British and West German

movements sought to establish transnational links on an organisational level through the newly founded European Federation against Nuclear Arms and, from 1963 onwards, through the International Confederation of Disarmament and Peace. Yet these newly founded organisations remained by and large inefficient and under-financed bodies.[12] The problems in international co-operation reflect the very different cultural norms which guided actors in the Cold Civil War.

The Protests against Nuclear Weapons and the Political Cultures of the Left

Most of the protesters in both countries were indeed 'middle class radicals', as the sociologist Frank Parkin has argued for Britain.[13] But only an analysis which is sensitive towards the cultural norms and languages which framed the protests can explore fully what this meant within a Cold War context. Both the British and the West German movement drew their cultural frames of reference from the social-democratic and socialist left. A survey of the social configurations of the campaigns demonstrates this.[14]

The cultural frames of reference on which many of the British protesters drew were in line with previous progressive coalitions in British politics, specifically those of the popular front of the 1930s.[15] In short, the British protests were the product of the collapse of a frail Cold War cultural consensus among the non-Communist Left which had emerged during a period of high international tensions in the late 1940s, but seemed not to suit the period of détente which followed the Geneva Summit in 1955.[16] This is why the British protests appeared to many contemporary observers as the 're-emergence of ideological politics' in an era in which supporters of the consensus had diagnosed an 'end of ideology'.[17]

CND has to be understood as a product of these changes within the political culture of the Labour Party since the Second World War. In a way, CND was one of the remnants of the broader social coalition which underpinned some of Labour's policies during the 1930s and particularly during the Labour government from 1945 to 1951.[18] Labour's electoral strength has always depended on the social alliance between organised sections of the working class and the professional middle class, broadly defined. In that, it was little different from pre-1914 progressive alliances espoused by the Liberal Party. This alliance had been forged during the Second World War, but broke down with the first Labour government in the early 1950s. The involvement of the professional middle class in the Labour Party had been strongly linked to its ethic of service and expertise in pursuit of humanitarian ends, and in its civilising mission at home and abroad. It depended on their consciousness of being notables – for example teachers, scientists or historians. In return, they sought deference towards their knowledge and insight.[19] This can be seen particularly well in the middle-class activities of the Workers Educational Association (WEA), and it seems no coincidence that many involved in CND on a local and national level, such as the historian E.P. Thompson, had links to the WEA.[20] However, this consciousness increasingly came under attack during the 1950s and 1960s when workers became more affluent and

a consumer youth culture developed which came to override the more conspicuous signs of traditional class distinctions. At the same time, the shock of Suez and the Cold War seemed to undermine the missionary values which the professional middle class had propagated. Moreover, the welfare state, envisioned as an exercise in Victorian philanthropy by many liberal progressives, seemed to develop, under Cold War pressures, into a bureaucratic monster which curtailed the mainly voluntary involvement which it was supposed to bring. Thus, in J.B. Priestley's words, 'the creative, enthusiastic, vigilant, and combative types, like the old Radicals I once knew, [began] to look like anachronisms'.[21] Cold War Britain appeared, to progressives like Priestley, as a 'wilderness'.[22] Although this socio-cultural framework reached back to the 1920s, if not earlier, there were genuinely new elements in the protests: intellectuals on the left did not remain content with traditional pressure-group activities, but addressed the British population as a whole.[23] In particular, very influential in both countries were those socialist organisations and bodies like the Woodcraft Folk in Britain [24] and the so-called social-democratic front organisations like the 'Friends of Nature' in West Germany, which had been more prominent in the 1920s but had virtually disappeared from the public sphere by the early 1950s.[25]

In a process that lasted through the 1950s, these different groups, albeit for very different reasons, came to think that the Cold War seriously infringed and hampered their social and cultural aspirations and projects.[26] Moreover, these groups gradually became dissatisfied with the Cold War consensus within the political culture of the Labour Party. In particular, they resented what they regarded as a development from welfare to warfare state. Aneurin Bevan's resignation in protest against the national health service reforms in the wake of the Korean War started this process off. The Suez crisis and the Soviet invasion in Hungary in 1956, together with the acceleration of the arms race in the late 1950s, confirmed the dissatisfaction; at the same time, Suez and Hungary suggested that overcoming the seemingly rigid Cold War framework was indeed possible.[27] It is, therefore, no accident that CND became particularly attractive for those on the Labour Left who held sympathetic views towards the German Democratic Republic and to the Soviet Union.[28] The loss of Bevan, the Labour Left's main ally in the Labour Party, to the more reformist camp on the issue of unilateral nuclear disarmament, was the cue for CND's foundation in early 1958. In the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, Harold Wilson (as party leader) was able through his rhetoric to re-integrate most of these groups back into the Labour Party.

This emerging coalition around CND consisted of various social groups of a, broadly speaking, left-wing political persuasion. Three groups in particular negotiated about the meaning of their resistance against the Cold War cultural consensus within CND: progressives, the dissenting Labour Left and the New Left. At the beginning, there were also more mainstream protesters who disagreed with the Macmillan government's defence policies. From 1959–60, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) participated in the campaign.[29]

The first of these groups which came together in the coalition belonged to the progressive spectrum of British politics. Most of the members of the first executive

knew each other from their previous involvement in other progressive causes and thus shared a common cultural frame of reference. Nearly all were members of what contemporary critics called 'The Establishment', with relatively direct access to political or media power. The first CND executive looks like the reinvigoration of J.B. Priestley's '1941 Committee', which had aimed at promoting national economic planning and the co-ordination of war production in order to assure victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War. A very strong Christian, often non-conformist or progressive Anglican, element was part of this tradition.[30] The creation of Christian CND as a campaign sub-group attests to the importance which specific religious traditions had for CND.[31]

Although these cultural frameworks became particularly attractive for younger people who wanted to express resistance to the dominant social and cultural norms and values later on, the CND executive was not particularly young. Although the executive was by no means fully representative of CND as a whole, in its local and regional forms, its composition does tell us something about the importance of traditional cultural frameworks for CND. The writer J.B. Priestley, born in 1894, was probably the most typical example for this group of socially-conscious middle-class intellectuals.[32] Following Bevan's defection from the unilateralist bandwagon at the Labour Party Conference in autumn 1957, it was Priestley who had first aired the idea of a Campaign against Nuclear Disarmament in an article for *The New Statesman* in autumn 1957, in order to unite the various protests which already existed. In order to prevent 'universal death and apocalypse', he advocated a 'new kind of politics'.[33] The aim of this new departure was to invigorate the middle classes once more with some kind of purpose – it thus strongly resembled the old politics of the middle class alliance. Priestley bemoaned the growth of a Cold War state and the resulting lack of communal spirit in Britain in several of his essays during the 1950s. And he regarded those who had been involved in progressive politics in the 1930s and 1940s as 'moral campaigners without a campaign'.[34] With CND, Priestley and the other progressives sought to recreate a community in the face of widespread apathy and mass consumption. The aim was, as Priestley put it in one of his *New Statesman* essays, to do away with 'the curious fatalism, almost like a sort of sleepwalking, which is beginning to afflict so many people, making them accept blindly any kind of power-mongering trick'.[35] CND's first chairman, Canon Collins, who had joined the Church during the Second World War, had been involved in a Christian group which aimed at alleviating poverty in the Third World.[36] Kingsley Martin, born in 1897 into a nonconformist family and editor of *The New Statesman*, had gained experience in the pacifist Union for Democratic Control in the interwar years and in earlier protests against nuclear weapons. Bertrand Russell, born in 1872, now in his eighties and President of CND until 1960, not only look could back on earlier involvement in anti-nuclear protests, but his whole political life had been characterised by a reluctance to use the traditional political machinery. He had been on trial during the First World War for his views on conscription and he had supported appeasement in the 1930s.[37] Peggy Duff, the organising secretary of CND and formerly organiser of the Common Wealth Party, was

the archetypal reformer who moved from one radical cause to another.[38] The publisher Victor Gollancz also took an interest in the campaign.[39]

The second group which brought their cultural assumptions into CND consisted of those wedded to old Labour movement traditions. A prominent example is Michael Foot, who also had strong links to the first group, mainly through Kingsley Martin. At the time, he was editor of *Tribune*, and thus represented the old *Keep Left* group in the Labour Party. Born in 1913 and thus one of the youngest members of the Executive Committee, Foot, in Kenneth Morgan's words, 'embodies and genuinely feels himself to embody, a powerful creative thrust of populistic radicalism that has been constant in British life for two centuries'.[40] Those MPs on the Labour Left sympathetic towards the GDR and the Soviet Union, like Frank Allaun, Ian Mikardo and Sidney Silverman, also belonged to this group.[41] They were primarily concerned about the economic effects of armaments. They feared that the Cold War would undermine the building of socialism in Britain which they thought had so hopefully begun during the Second World War and between 1945 and 1951. At the same time, they were concerned that giving in – in the way that the Gaitskellites in the Labour Party conceived it – to what they regarded as the dangerous trends within affluent British society meant giving up the project of a socialist society altogether. Old Labour movement traditions were particularly influential cultural norms in Scotland where socialist and communist groups tended to dominate CND.[42]

The third group which joined the CND coalition was the New Left. Members of this group could relate to the concerns of the other groups. They were concerned that the Cold War discredited and thus endangered the project for a socialist society. For them, the future of socialism did not lie in reformist politics, as proposed by the reformist Anthony Crosland. Instead, it depended fundamentally on the relaxation of tensions which would allow the confluence of Communist and left-wing social-democratic trends. From this perspective, Labour reformism meant giving in to Cold War structures. They also agreed, on a surface level, with the negative analyses of affluent society by the progressive Liberals and by the old Labourites. Moreover, particularly the older members of the New Left could relate to the politics of a progressive alliance of the 1930s. Unlike the other two groups, however, they did not want to achieve their aims through parliamentary channels. They sought to widen the scope of the progressive alliance by persuasion and by establishing a New Left milieu.[43] The story of CND is one in which the first two strands lost importance and the younger New Left, for a short time, gained influence in the Campaign as a whole. The coalition of these three groups was very precarious throughout and lasted for about two years – the departure of the much more radical Committee of 100 from CND in autumn 1960 signalled its break-up.[44]

Although the National Socialist regime had left a horrific imprint on the memories of the German labour movement, the West German protesters tapped into their very own traditions.[45] We can see a genealogy of protesting traditions, coming from the 'Friends of Nature' or the war resisters' groups into the Easter Marches.[46] But unlike in Britain, these traditions were not transmitted directly from one generation to the next.

Rather, the protesters actively appropriated these traditions in their search to give meaning to their resistance against the West German Cold War consensus. The groups which were particularly strong in the West German protest movement, however, were those which were closest to the outlook of the Committee of 100: those with strong links to anarchist and radical pacifist traditions around the West German branch of the War Resisters' International (*Internationale der Kriegsdienstgegner*) and another organisation of conscientious objectors, the more anti-communist *Verband der Kriegsdienstverweigerer*.[47] Although the pacifist *Peace News* was the main British campaign newspaper even after CND's *Sanity* had been launched in the early 1960s, radical pacifism never had the importance as a cultural reference point for British protesters that it had for their West German counterparts.[48] In West Germany, as in the United States, radical pacifist cultural norms were much more important for framing the protests.[49]

The Social Democrats, who had organised the first phase of the campaign, distanced themselves from the Easter Marches, which they regarded as a communist plot. There were even discussions in the SPD's presidential committee, the *Präsidium*, whether to ban members who took part in the Marches.[50] Having been rejected by the SPD, they were now labelled as Communist fifth columnists to an extent never seen in Britain.[51] They thus became the crucible for the emergence of a West German New Left which was formed from a variety of groups, primarily radical pacifists, socialist workers associations and the Socialist German Student Federation, the SDS. The fact that they were outside respectable politics and much more loosely organised than the hierarchical CND made them much more radical than their British counterpart, comparable only to the Committee of 100. At the same time, the model of the alliance of progressive forces was not as readily available a model for West German organisers as it was in Britain.[52] On the one hand, the Cold War political culture unduly curtailed the breadth of the alliance by limiting it to liberal and social-democratic groupings and by excluding the socialist and Communist forces. On the other hand, the National Socialist regime had destroyed not only many of the structures of middle-class sociability (one of the main preconditions for such an alliance), but also much of the confidence of the German middle-class.[53]

'Peace' and Cold War Cultures

These cultural traditions framed the negotiations amongst protesters of what the resistance against the Cold War was supposed to mean. This section sketches some key areas in these debates in order to highlight the complex interaction between the protest movements, the cultures of the Cold War, and political and social traditions of the left in both countries. The debates about protest forms within both countries reveal this interaction. The first march which was organised by the traditionally pacifist Direct Action Committee in 1958 against much resistance within the CND executive focused on symbolic protests at the research establishment. The subsequent marches, by contrast, went *from* Aldermaston *to* London. Although this was mainly in

order to attract more demonstrators, the different direction gave the marches a different meaning, a meaning of which the protesters were aware. By staging the main protests at the centres of power in Whitehall and Westminster, the Campaign emphasised the essentially pressure-group character of the march, very much in line with previous progressive politics.[54]

We can see the importance of traditional cultural frameworks particularly clearly when considering the songs which were sung on the marches. The lyrics were mostly, but not always, new. But the tunes were often those of labour movement and folk songs which had been around for some time. To give but two examples: 'H-Bomb's Thunder', one of the more popular Easter March tunes, was sung to the tune of Miners' Lifeguard, while 'Join in the Line' (by Ewan MacColl and Denise Keir) was sung to the tune of an American trade-union song.[55]

The discussions between the Committee of 100 and CND about civil disobedience as a form of protest also reveal the negotiations about the cultural meaning of protest in a Cold War context. Tapping the cultural norms of anarchists and radical pacifists, the Committee of 100, much to the dislike of the traditional Labour supporters and the progressives, advocated methods of campaigning that involved breaking the law.[56] The people who had founded the Committee had, via the DAC, strong links to radical pacifist and anarchist traditions. The Committee was also popular amongst key members of the New Left such as Stuart Hall, who took a keen interest in it.[57] Yet it was never able to gain significant influence in the Campaign as a whole. The progressive liberals regarded the strategy of non-violent direct action which the Committee of 100 espoused as an aberration and slowly dissociated themselves from the Campaign as a whole. They feared that continued, albeit indirect, association with the Campaign would further damage their reputation in the eyes of the British public.[58] Such conceptions about the respectability of protests in Britain had become part of British political culture after the First World War, when attempts to prevent the violence of the First World War from taking hold of British domestic society had resulted in a version of British national identity which highlighted its character as a 'peaceable kingdom'.[59] They also challenged the political culture of democratic politics which had emerged in Western Europe after 1945.[60] When Harold Wilson, as Labour Party leader from 1963 onwards, found a rhetoric to reunite such an alliance under new auspices within the Labour Party, and when Cold War détente seemed to make the issue of nuclear weapons less urgent, CND finally declined. The small Committee of 100 thus prefigured those forms of protests which the students and anti-Vietnam war protesters used in the mid- and late-1960s. It also contained, in embryonic form, those cultural frameworks which were to influence the new social movements in the 1970s and 1980s.[61]

The role of arguments about respectability and the relative absence of arguments about communist subversion are striking when we compare the British discussions to the contemporary debates in the Federal Republic. This was one of the most important features which distinguished the British campaign's socio-political environment from the cultural norms which framed social actions in the West German movement.

Whereas British protesters discussed protest forms under the heading of 'respectability', their West German counterparts referred to 'communist subversion'. After the SPD had abandoned the campaign, the SPD and the wider public did not regard the grassroots protests as such as a threat to democracy. They instead pointed to the fact that they took place outside the organisational realm of anti-communist politics in general and the SPD in particular.[62]

Although there were differences of outlook in *both* movements, between those who thought that war could never be a legitimate means of politics, those who held that war was legitimate under special circumstances, and those who accepted a national self-defence argument (though in circumstances different to those envisaged by the British government), some more fundamental differences are evident in the uses made of the word 'peace'.[63] While in Britain 'peace' was often connected to the *Pax Britannica* of the nineteenth century when Britain and the British navy ruled the waves[64], in West Germany 'peace' was something seemingly conspicuous by its absence during the preceding 100 or so years of German history. Germany had always been a divided nation – with fissures running along political, religious and class lines. For the last century, it had been a nation-state engaged in a succession of wars. Now, after the Second World War, many in the movement saw the chance to bring about change. Yet the problem was that the dreams of those who protested had not been fulfilled by the government and that, to a much greater extent than in Britain, 'peace' had become a dirty word, sounding like Communist propaganda.[65] The movements' supporters on the Left regretted that the aims of peace and freedom had become detached due to the anti-Communist political culture and the Cold War. The word 'peace' was now restricted for use by the East only, while the word 'freedom' was confined to the vocabulary of the West. Demands by the West German campaign that the Western alliance should disarm unilaterally could, given the prevailing anti-communism in West German political culture, easily be denounced as Communist propaganda.

This leads on to the wider question of the role of communism and anti-communism within the movements. While CND felt it necessary to dispel impressions of Communist subversion only from time to time, anti-Communism was one of the defining characteristics of the Campaign Against Atomic Death and the early Easter Marches until about 1964. In Britain, CND only rarely, and then less vehemently, needed to defend itself against charges of Communist subversion. CND supporters were regarded as politically naive rather than as Communists, although the government was very well aware of the dangers of Communist subversion. More generally, pro-Soviet and pro-GDR sentiments could be voiced far more openly in the British Labour Party than in the SPD.[66]

Although the emerging West German New Left advocated a policy of neutrality, most of the West German campaigners, by contrast, thought clearly in terms of the East-West conflict at least until the early 1960s. Most of them were staunchly anti-communist. It is therefore a myth that the West German Easter Marches were an instrument of Soviet power politics. Those communists who did take part in the campaign and particularly in the Easter Marches did so as much on their

own initiative as under orders from their comrades behind the Iron Curtain. A reinvigoration of a specific cultural framework took place, whose vocabulary was replicated by the East German government. It is often forgotten that the SPD and the KPD had shared common traditions[67], which had survived the National Socialist regime particularly in groups such as the 'Friends of Nature'. In Britain, a history of the Communist Party too narrowly focused on the political relationship with Moscow has obscured this context.[68]

In the SPD-run Campaign against Atomic Death, there existed an almost paranoid fear of Communist subversion. The SPD went as far as working together with the political police to find out who abused the name of the Campaign and who might be affiliated to the successor organisations of the Communist Party, which had been ruled illegal in 1956.[69] The same was true for the Easter Marches. The organisers of the first March feared Communist subversion. This was one of the reasons behind the decision to prohibit organisations (with the exception of the Quakers) from taking part in the Marches under their own names. It also led the organisers to impose a fairly strict regime where slogans for the March were drawn up in advance and all posters had to be vetted before the marches. Specially appointed stewards excluded any slogan absent from the list.[70]

However, the role which staunch anti-communism played within negotiations about cultural meaning in the West German movement receded from about 1962 when the Socialist German Student Federation (the SDS) and the emerging New Left became more important. Although the emerging New Left made it very clear that they despised what they saw as the totalitarian regime of the Eastern bloc states, they argued that this should not prevent the West from negotiating with the East. Hoping for détente between the superpowers, the New Left and the students were, in general, much more open towards socialism, although they despised the Soviet Union. They regretted that the SPD, with the Godesberg programme, had become too revisionist and had accepted the status quo not only in international relations but also in domestic affairs. For them, as with many in the British New Left and the Labour Left, the Soviet Union was a bad example of socialism which did not discredit socialism as a whole.[71] Thus, the Easter Marches moved from being *within* the general anti-totalitarian consensus (on which, according to the official governmental line, the Federal Republic was built) to a position *beyond* that consensus. They attacked the dominance of anti-communism in the political culture of the Federal Republic.[72] Within the West German context, this position appeared much more radical than that of the British left-wingers who, in fact, made the very same points, but in an environment which was much more dispassionate about the communist fifth-column – despite the red scares of a decade earlier.[73]

The ways in which protesters negotiated the meaning of protests against the cultural Cold War consensus were often highly gendered. More men than women were active in the campaign. There were CND women's sections in Britain which, by linking male domination in politics with the nuclear arms race, perpetuated the traditional language of feminist anti-militarism.[74] In West Germany, by contrast, the Cold War

facilitated readjustments in the discourse of feminist anti-militarism, as the traditional framework had already been occupied by the East German regime.[75]

Although these discussions were deeply embedded in traditions which preceded the Cold War, they acquired innovative meanings in a Cold War context. The movements' supporters reinvigorated these traditions in very specific and novel Cold War cultural contexts. During the Cold War, 'peace' became a polemical term in the original sense of the word: it was used to fight propaganda wars by the East and by the West. In April 1949, two international conferences took place, one in Prague, the other in Paris. Both were dedicated to the '*partisans de la paix*', the partisans of peace. The Cold War had just reached its first climax, as the blockade of the Western sectors of Berlin was still in progress. The historical meaning of the two conferences lay not only in their propagandistic value for the East but also in the emblem which was used. Louis Aragon had decorated the main hall with posters that showed Pablo Picasso's design of a white dove on a blue background. The dove started its flight round the world. At the World Youth Festival in the German Democratic Republic in 1951, doves were released as a symbol of the 'fight for peace'. But the Western world was unimpressed. As early as July 1950, the American Secretary of State Dean Acheson called the dove the 'Trojan pigeon of the Communist movement'.[76]

'Freedom' and 'peace', therefore, fast became the central terms in the propaganda war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union attacked the US by pointing out that its build-up of nuclear weapons endangered world peace. The same was true for the government of the GDR. Its government and party preferred the term 'peace movement' to 'pacifism'. For the East European governments, 'pacifism' was a bourgeois ideology whose 'aim was to split the socialist camp' and whose 'stubborn' and 'overly moralistic attitude' was harmful to the spreading of the socialist dream.[77] Conversely, the United States regarded the Soviet Union as a totalitarian system, as an enemy of 'freedom'. The West German government distinguished internally between the 'real nuclear protesters' and 'communist pacifists', but, in terms of press and propaganda, nonetheless tried to brand the protests as dangerous signs of Western weakness.[78] The British government, although to a lesser degree, made similar connections between the protests against nuclear weapons and the communist party, as did Hugh Gaitskell in his conference speech at Scarborough in 1960 in which he accused the victorious unilateralists of being Communist fellow travellers.[79] This was somewhat ironic, given that the British Communist Party supported CND only from about 1960 onwards.

These definitions meant that, in the political discourses within both camps, the West had become the 'free world', whereas the East had become the 'peace camp'. Although these developments were international, they manifested themselves differently in British and West German society. The most striking difference between the movements lies in the ways in which the Cold War restricted the protesters' ability to negotiate the cultural meanings of 'peace' without sounding like mouthpieces of Communist propaganda. This phenomenon was far stronger in West Germany than in Britain. The movements were thus no longer peace movements in the traditional sense

of the phrase. Rather, traditional pacifists had to come to terms with the new meaning 'peace' acquired during the Cold War.[80] In West Germany more than in Britain, the term 'peace' became almost a term of abuse. In Britain, the memory of appeasement in the 1930s seemed to make 'peace' a problematic term. For Communists, by contrast, 'peace' became a rallying cry for social progress.[81]

For most of the campaigns' supporters in Britain and West Germany, the Bomb was the overriding problem of the time, not just a symbol for other conflicts. But, at the same time, when they shouted 'Ban the Bomb', what they meant was much more: they meant the whole Cold War framework, both in domestic and in international affairs, along with what they regarded as a Cold War mindset, which they characterised as a neglect of those traditions which were worth preserving and of those perspectives which offered the best future. Unlike others, the protesters resisted regarding the Cold War as a normal political condition. In their view, the Cold War was not a 'long peace'.[82] The West German essayist Hans Werner Richter, founder of the literary circle *Gruppe 47* and active in the West German anti-nuclear campaign in Munich, bemoaned this situation in a speech he gave in March 1956: 'Isn't it shocking', he asked, 'that someone who stands up against the awakening of militarism here supports Eastern militarism since he could please those gentlemen in the GDR who welcome and exploit these sentiments?' He continued, 'And isn't it the case that we run the danger of justifying West German militarism, if we portray the situation in the East as it is and attack it accordingly?'[83] The British historian E.P. Thompson, an activist in the 1960s and again in the 1980s, advocated going 'beyond the Cold War'. For him, the Cold War was 'an abnormal political condition'. Like Richter, he regretted that the 'Cold War has been a received condition, which has set the first premises of politics and ideology. [It had become] a settled and unquestioned premise: a habit'.[84] For different generations, therefore, the political culture of the left which stemmed from before the Cold War became, in manifold ways, a way to resist what they perceived as the stifling framework of Cold War politics in their countries. However, their experiences differed profoundly. While the British activists had grown up within this milieu, their West German counterparts had to actively appropriate these pieces of left-wing culture: the National Socialist regime had destroyed all these traditions, and they were too young to have participated in the milieux themselves.[85]

Conclusion

This brief overview cannot do justice to the complicated ways in which the protests functioned as social movements. Yet the processes which have been highlighted here, nonetheless, allow some insights into the character of the campaigns as a whole. Supporters were aware of these different traditions both within their own countries and in an international context. They (and in particular the New Left) constantly discussed the importance of these traditions. CND thus appears as the last of these progressive alliances in post-Second World War Britain. It is a sign of the increasing weakness of these cultural frameworks in the face of the Cold War and an increasingly

affluent society that it was now no longer integrated into the Labour movement, in the way that the progressive alliances of the 1930s and, particularly, the 1940s had been. Also, many of the first generation of progressive liberals left CND, as they were soon disappointed by the fact that it only imperfectly re-built the old progressive alliance. Younger people and many in the New Left, particularly those in the Committee of 100, no longer clung to the political ideas which these progressive liberals had espoused. In West Germany, by contrast, the Easter Marches became the harbinger of a new form of protest. The different ways in which the various traditions interacted with the culture of the Cold War can explain this. A much younger generation of activists sought to appropriate the traditions of the socialist left of the 1920s as an effective way to express resistance against Cold War cultural norms in the context of an increasingly affluent society. Thus, they transcended the cultural norms for respectable politics during the Cold War: they could appear as products of communist subversion much more easily than in Britain.[86]

This argument has implications for interpreting Cold War society and culture. The Cold War had profound effects on the ways in which different groups in British and West German society perceived processes of social change and their position within these processes. Although the movements' supporters were united in their desire to reach beyond the Cold War, the forms in which they expressed their misgivings went not beyond but rather back to the time before the Cold War. Even though CND and its West German counterpart were concerned with the genuinely new problem of nuclear weapons, the campaigns tapped into progressive political and social traditions of the early twentieth century. We cannot understand the cultures of the Cold War fully if we do not look back to reservoirs of meanings and experiences reaching back to at least the 1930s.

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Notes

[1] This definition follows Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981), vol. 2, pp.182–228. Cf. also the contemporary interpretation by Raymond Williams: *Culture and Society, 1780–1950* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1958) and the theoretical piece by William H. Sewell, Jr., 'The Concept(s) of Culture', in Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (eds.), *Beyond the Cultural Turn. New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture* (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1999), pp.35–61.

[2] Peter Hennessy, *The Secret State. Whitehall and the Cold War* (London: Allen Lane, 2002), p.1.

[3] Cf. Peter Catterall, 'Contemporary British History: A Personal View', *Contemporary British History*, 16 (2002), pp.1–10, here p.3. For a more recent work cf. Hugh Wilford, *The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War. Calling the Tune?* (London: Frank Cass, 2003). For West Germany cf. Patrick Major, *The Death of the KPD. Communism and anti-Communism in West Germany,*

1945–1956 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 2000).

[4] April Carter, *Peace Movements. International Protest and World Politics since 1945* (London: Longman, 1992) and Lawrence S. Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb. Vol. 2: Resisting the Bomb. A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement 1954–1970* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).

[5] Trevor Fisher has stressed these continuities in another area: 'Permissiveness and the Politics of Morality', *Contemporary Record*, 7 (1993), pp.149–65.

[6] Cf. Richard Taylor, *Against the Bomb. The British Peace Movement 1958–1965* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), pp.42, 57, and p.77, footnote 16.

[7] Lawrence S. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, pp.65 and 220 and Hans Karl Rupp, *Auβerparlamentarische Opposition in der Ära Adenauer: Der Kampf gegen die Atombewaffnung in den fünfiger Jahren. Eine Studie zur innenpolitischen Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1984), pp.130–43.

[8] The standard work is Taylor, *Against the Bomb*. Good on continuities: Christopher Driver, *The Disarmers. A Study in Protest* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1964).

[9] Major, *Death of the KPD*, p.294. Cf., as one example amongst many, 'Gesteuerte Atomhysterie', *Rheinischer Merkur*, 9 Apr. 1954.

[10] On continuities with earlier protest movements cf. Jost Dülffer, 'The Movement against Rearmament 1951–55 and the movement against nuclear armament 1957/59 in the Federal Republic: A Comparison', in Maurice Vaïsse (ed.), *Le pacifisme en Europe des années 1920 aux années 1950* (Brussels: Bruylant, 1993), pp.417–34.

[11] The standard works are: Rupp, *Auβerparlamentarische Opposition*; Karl A. Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO. Geschichte der ausserparlamentarischen Opposition in der Bundesrepublik 1960–1970* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1982).

[12] Cf. Holger Nehring, 'Toward a social history of transnational relations: The British and West German protests against nuclear weapons, 1957–1964', in Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (eds.), *New Perspectives in Culture and International History* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2005 (in preparation)).

[13] Cf. Frank Parkin, *Middle Class Radicalism. The Social Bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968) and the critical assessment by Paul Bagguley, 'Middle-class Radicalism Revisited', in Tim Butler and Mike Savage (eds.), *Social Change and the Middle Classes* (London: UCL Press, 1995), pp.293–309.

[14] Cf. more generally: Brian Harrison, 'A Genealogy of Reform in Modern Britain', in Christine Bolt and Seymour Drescher (eds.), *Anti-Slavery, Religion, and Reform: Essays in Memory of Roger Anstey* (Folkestone and Hamden, Conn.: Dawson, 1980), pp.119–148.

[15] Cf. David Blaazer, *The Popular Front and the Progressive Traditions. Socialists, Liberals, and the Quest for Unity, 1884–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Tom Buchanan, *The Spanish Civil War and the British labour movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[16] On the emergence of this consensus in Britain: Wilford, *CIA*, pp.17–47. In West Germany, this consensus emerged later. Cf. Julia Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie. Die Westernisierung von SPD und DGB* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003).

[17] Henry J. Steck, 'The Re-Emergence of Ideological Politics in Great Britain: The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament', *The Western Political Quarterly*, 18 (1965), pp.87–103 and Giles Scott-Smith, 'The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the End of Ideology and the 1955 Milan Conference', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 37 (2002), 437–456.

[18] Cf. Lawrence Black, *The Political Culture of the Left in Affluent Britain, 1951–64. Old Labour, New Britain?* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2003), especially pp.12–40.

[19] Gareth Stedman Jones, 'Why is the Labour Party in a Mess?', in Jones, *Languages of Class. Studies in English Working Class History, 1832–1982* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp.239–256, especially pp.245–51.

[20] This is highlighted by Stephen Woodhams, *History in the Making. Raymond Williams, Edward Thompson and Radical Intellectuals, 1936–1956* (London: Merlin, 2001). For the general background cf. Lawrence Goldman, *Dons and Workers: Oxford and Adult Education since 1850* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp.248–98.

[21] J.B. Priestley, 'Our New Society' [1955], in Priestley, *Thoughts in the Wilderness* (London: Heinemann, 1957), pp.120–26, here p.124.

[22] J.B. Priestley, 'Thoughts in the Wilderness', in Priestley, *Thoughts*, pp.1–7. Cf. the similar arguments in E.P. Thompson (ed.), *Out of Apathy* (London: Stevens & Sons, 1960).

[23] Cf. for a similar campaign: Tom Buchanan, "The Truth will set you free": The Making of Amnesty International', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 37 (2002), pp.575–97.

[24] Cf. David Prynn, 'The Woodcraft Folk and the Labour Movement 1925–70', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 18 (1983), pp.79–95 and R.A. Wilford, 'The "Federation of Progressive Societies and Individuals"', in *Journal of Contemporary History*, 11 (1976), pp.49–82.

[25] Cf. Jochen Zimmer, 'Das Abseits als vermiedener Irrweg. Die Natufreundejugend in der westdeutschen Friedens- und Ökologiebewegung bis zum Ende der APO', in Heinz Hoffmann and Jochen Zimmer (eds.), *Wir sind die grüne Garde. Geschichte der Naturfreundejugend* (Essen: Klartext, 1986), pp.93–110; and Klaus Vack, 'Blick zurück ohne Zorn? – Einige politisch-persönliche Auskünfte über Engagement und Organisation sozialer Bewegungen', *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen*, 2 (Nov. 1989), pp.131–139.

[26] Brynmor Jones Library, University of Hull [henceforth BJL], John Saville papers, JS-109: John Saville to Ralph [Samuel], 21 May 1958.

[27] BJL, John Saville papers, JS-109: Edward P. Thompson to John Saville, 31 Mar. n.y. [1958?].

[28] Cf. Darren G. Lilleker, 'Against the Cold War: The nature and traditions of pro-Soviet sentiment in the British Labour Party 1945–89' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Sheffield, 2002); Stefan Berger and Darren Lilleker, 'The British Labour Party and the German Democratic Republic during the Era of Non-Recognition, 1949–1973', *Historical Journal*, 45 (2002), pp.433–58.

[29] John Callaghan, *Cold War, Crisis and Conflict: The CPGB 1951–1968* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2003), pp.141–151.

[30] Cf. D.L. Prynn, 'Common Wealth – A British "Third Party" of the 1940s', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 7 (1972), pp.169–79 and Angus Calder, *The People's War. Britain 1939–1945* (London: Pimlico, 1969), pp.546–50.

[31] On religion and the Cold War more generally cf. Dianne Kirby (ed.), *Religion and the Cold War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

[32] Chris Waters, 'J.B. Priestley 1894–1984. Englishness and the politics of nostalgia', in Susan Pedersen and Peter Mandler (eds.), *After the Victorians: Private conscience and public duty in modern Britain. Essays in memory of John Clive* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), pp.209–26.

[33] J.B. Priestley, 'Britain and the Nuclear Bombs', *New Statesman* 54 (2 Nov., 1957), pp.554–556, here p.555.

[34] Priestley, 'Thoughts in the Wilderness', p.4.

[35] Priestley, 'Time, please', in Priestley, *Thoughts*, pp.40–46, here p.45.

[36] Canon L. John Collins, *Faith under Fire* (London: Leslie Frewin, 1966).

[37] On Russell cf. Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1996) and Monk, *Bertrand Russell, 1921–70: The Ghost of Madness* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000), especially pp.373–453.

[38] Peggy Duff, *Left, Left, Left: A Personal account of six protest campaigns 1945–65* (London: Allison & Busby, 1971).

[39] Ruth Dudley Edwards, *Victor Gollancz: A Biography* (London: Gollancz, 1987).

[40] Kenneth O. Morgan, *Labour People: Leaders and Lieutenants, Hardie to Kinnock* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.278.

[41] Stefan Berger and Darren Lilleker, 'Blutrünstige Diktatur, das bessere Deutschland oder Stolperstein auf dem Weg zur friedlichen Koexistenz? Die DDR im Blick der britischen Labour Party, 1949–1973', in: Arnd Bauerkämper (ed.), *Britain and the GDR: Relations and Perceptions in a Divided World* (Berlin and Vienna: Philo, 2002), pp.235–66, here pp.249–52.

[42] Cf. Willie Thompson, 'The New Left in Scotland', in Ian MacDougall (ed.), *Essays in Scottish Labour History: A Tribute to W.H. Marwick* (Edinburgh: Donald, 1978), pp.207–24. Cf. also Daly Papers, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick [henceforth MRC], MSS.302/3/12: Rules of the Fife Socialist League, [n.d.].

[43] BJL, John Saville papers, JS-109: Edward P. Thompson to John Saville, n.d. [c. Apr. 1958]; Edward P. Thompson, 'Where are we now?' n.d. [c. 1963]; BJL, John Saville papers, JS-108: Edward P. Thompson to John Saville, n.d. [c. Jan. 1957].

[44] Frank E. Myers, 'Civil Disobedience and Organizational Change: The British Committee of 100', *Political Science Quarterly*, 86 (1971), pp.92–112 and Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, pp.190–269.

[45] On the more general developments of British and West German Social Democracy after 1945 cf. Stefan Berger, 'The Labour Party and the German Social Democrats (1945–1994)', in: Stephen Haseler and Henning Meyer (eds.), *Reshaping Social Democracy: Labour and the SPD in the New Century* (London: European Research Forum, 2004), pp.29–45. On revisionism in comparative perspective cf. Anthony J. Nicholls, 'Zwei Wege in den Revisionismus: die Labour Partei und die SPD in der Ära des Godesberger Programms', in: Jürgen Kocka et al. (eds.), *Von der Arbeiterbewegung zum modernen Sozialstaat. Festschrift für Gerhard A. Ritter* (Munich: K.G., Saur, 1994), pp.190–204.

[46] Cf. Claus Leggewie, *Kofferträger. Das Algerien-Projekt der Linken im Adenauer-Deutschland* (Berlin: Rotbuch, 1984).

[47] Horst Bethge, "Die Bombe ist böse." Wie in Hamburg der Ostermarsch entstand', in Jörg Berlin (ed.), *Das andere Hamburg. Freiheitliche Bestrebungen in der Hansestadt seit dem Spätmittelalter* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1981), pp.357–68.

[48] On *Peace News* cf. Albert Beale, *Against All War: Fifty Years of Peace News, 1936–1986* (Nottingham: Peace News, 1986).

[49] On the USA cf. Allen Smith, 'Present at the Creation ... and other Myths: The Port Huron Statement and the Origins of the New Left', *Peace & Change*, 25 (2000), pp.339–62.

[50] *Archiv der sozialen Demokratie*, Bonn [henceforth AdsD]: Minutes of the *Parteivorstand*, 9–10 Jan. 1961; Minutes of the *Präsidium*, 20 Feb. 1961, pp.837–838.

[51] Cf. Rolf Elker et al. (ed.), *Beiträge zur Geschichte des SDS* (Berlin: Asta FU Berlin, 1987), p.45.

[52] Cf. Hans Manfred Bock, 'Der schwierige Dritte Weg im Sozialismus. Die *Sozialistische Politik* und ihre gesellschaftlichen Trägergruppen 1954 bis 1966 im Spektrum linkssozialistischer Zeitschriften', in Michel Grunewald and Hans Manfred Bock (eds.), *Le milieu intellectuel de gauche en Allemagne, sa presse et ses réseaux (1890–1960)* (Berne: P. Lang, 2002), pp.659–88.

[53] Georg Bollenbeck, *Bildung und Kultur: Glanz und Elend eines deutschen Deutungsmusters* (Frankfurt: Insel, 1994).

[54] Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, pp.28–9. For discussions in the Federal Republic cf. Otto, *Ostermarsch*, pp.92–5.

[55] Cf. MRC, CND papers, MSS.181/4: *Songs and Hopes Instead: The Sanity Songbook*. For the background cf. Georgina Boyes, *The Imagined Village: Culture, Ideology and the English Folk Revival* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993) as well as Gerald Porter, "The World's Ill-Divided": the Communist Party and Progressive Song', in Andy Croft

(ed.), *A Weapon in the Struggle: The Cultural History of the Communist Party in Britain* (London: Pluto, 1998), pp.171–91.

[56] Cf. Adam Roberts, 'The Uncertain Anarchists', *New Society*, 27 May 1965, pp.16–18; David Stafford, 'Anarchists in Britain today', in David E. Apter and James Joll (eds.), *Anarchism Today* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1971), pp.84–104.

[57] Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, pp.216–69.

[58] Myers, 'Civil Disobedience'.

[59] Jon Lawrence, 'Forging a Peaceable Kingdom: War, Violence, and Fear of Brutalization in Post-First World War Britain', *Journal of Modern History*, 75 (2003), pp.557–89; Susan Kingsley Kent, *Making Peace: The Reconstruction of Gender in Interwar Britain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), ch. 6; Charles Townshend, *Making the Peace. Public Order and Public Security in Modern Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp.132–44.

[60] Martin Conway, 'The Rise and Fall of Western Europe's Democratic Age, 1945–1973', *Contemporary European History*, 13 (2004), pp.67–88.

[61] Cf. Myers, 'Civil Disobedience' and Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, pp.269–272.

[62] AdsD: Minutes of the SPD *Parteivorstand*, 17 Feb. 1961.

[63] On these distinctions cf. Martin Ceadel, *Thinking about Peace and War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

[64] Cf. Hinton, *Protests and Visions*, p.154.

[65] Cf. Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, "Im Kampf um Frieden" und "Freiheit". Über den Zusammenhang von Ideologie und Sozialkultur im Ost-West-Konflikt', in Hans Günter Hockerts (ed.), Koordinaten deutscher Geschichte in der Epoche des Ost-West-Konflikts (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004), pp.29–47; Edward P. Thompson, *Beyond the Cold War* (London: Merlin Press, 1982), p.6.

[66] On the accusation of political naivety cf. the material in Lord Simon of Wythenshawe Papers, Manchester Archives and Local Studies, M11 8/3. On the relevance of pro-Soviet and pro-GDR sentiments in the Labour Party cf. Lilleker, *Against the Cold War*.

[67] Cf. Klaus-Michael Mallmann, *Kommunisten in der Weimarer Republik. Sozialgeschichte einer revolutionären Bewegung* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1996).

[68] On the research agenda cf. Harriet Jones, 'Conference Report: Is CPGB History important?', *Labour History Review*, 67 (2002), pp.347–53 and Kevin Morgan, 'Labour with Knobs on? The Recent Historiography of the British Communist Party', *Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen*, 27 (2002), pp.69–83. For examples of a more milieu-centred account CF. Callaghan, *Cold War*. Thought-provoking: Raphael Samuel, 'The Lost World of British Communism', Parts I, II, III, *New Left Review*, 154 (Nov./Dec. 1985), pp.3–53; 156 (Mar./Apr. 1986), pp.63–113; 165 (Sep./Oct. 1987), pp.52–91 and John Saville, 'The Communist Experience: A Personal Appraisal', *Socialist Register* (1991), pp.1–27.

[69] Cf., for example, AdsD, 2/PVAM000018: Ansgar Skriver to Alexander Maaβ, 3 Apr. 1960.

[70] Private archive Hans-Konrad Tempel, Ahrensburg (Germany): 'Ostermarsch der Atomwaffengegner, Zentraler Ausschuβ: Kernsätze für die Redner des Ostermarsches der Atomwaffengegner', [autumn 1960]; AdsD, 2/PVAM000017: Irmgard Löwe to Alexander Maaβ, 26 Mar. 1961.

[71] On the New Left in Britain and West Germany: Michael Kenny, *The First New Left: British Intellectuals after Stalin* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1995); Siegward Lönnendonker, Bernd Rabehl and Jochen Staadt, *Die antiautoritäre Revolte. Der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund nach der Trennung von der SPD. Vol. I: 1960 – 1967* (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002). Cf. AdsD, 2/PVAM000012: Willy Brandt to Walter Menzel, 28 Jan. 1960.

[72] Major, *Death of the KPD*, pp.259–277.

[73] Cf. F.S. Northedge and Audrey Wells, *Britain and Soviet Communism. The Impact of a Revolution* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1982), pp.103–25 and Peter Weiler, *British*

Labour and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); cf. Phillip Deery, "The Secret Batallion": Communism in Britain during the Cold War', *Contemporary British History*, 13, 4 (1999), pp.1–28 and Callaghan, *Cold War*.

[74] MRC, CND papers, MSS.181/4: 'Women ask why. An intelligent woman's guide to nuclear disarmament' [1962], p.15. More generally: Jill Liddington, *The Long Road to Greenham: Feminism and Anti-militarism in Britain since 1820* (London: Virago, 1989).

[75] Irene Stoehr, "Feministischer Antikommunismus" und weibliche Staatsbürgerschaft in der Gründungsdekade der Bundesrepublik', *Feministische Studien*, 16, 1 (1998), pp.86–94; Irene Stoehr, 'Der Mütterkongreβ fand nicht statt. Frauenbewegungen, Staatsmänner und Kalter Krieg 1950', *WerkstattGeschichte*, 17 (1997), pp.66–82.

[76] *New York Times*, 13 July 1950.

[77] Jürgen von Hehn, 'Die Weltfriedensbewegung im Atomzeitalter', *Europa-Archiv*, 20 Aug. 1954, pp.6807–6821.

[78] Cf., for example, *Bundesarchiv Koblenz* [henceforth BAK], B106/16054: 'Die kommunistische Kampagne gegen die atomare Bewaffnung der Bundeswehr (1 June to 15 Sep.1958)', and BAK B106/16053: 'Komitee gegen die Atomrüstung, Würzburg', Dec. 1958.

[79] Quoted in Brian Brivati, *Hugh Gaitskell* (London, 1997), p.374. Cf. also Callaghan, *Cold War*, pp.141–51 and Hennessy, *Secret State*, pp.100–112; Paul Mercer, *"Peace" of the dead: The truth behind the nuclear disarmers* (London, 1986), pp.46–82.

[80] On CND's views on international relations cf. Mark Phythian, 'CND's Cold War', *Contemporary British History*, 15 (2001), pp.133–56.

[81] Arnold Sywottek, 'Die Opposition der SPD und der KPD gegen die westdeutsche Aufrüstung in der Tradition sozialdemokratischer und kommunistischer Friedenspolitik seit dem Ersten Weltkrieg', in: Wolfgang Huber and Johannes Schwerdtfeger (eds.), *Frieden, Gewalt, Sozialismus. Studien zur Geschichte der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1976), pp.497–610; Callaghan, *Cold War*, pp.141–51.

[82] John Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

[83] *Stiftung Archiv Akademie der Künste, Berlin, Hans Werner Richter Archiv*, 72.86.511: Hans Werner Richter, 'Rede zur Gründung des Gründwalder Kreises', n.d. [4 Mar. 1956, Sportschule Grünwald], p.5.

[84] Cf. Thompson, *Beyond the Cold War*, p.3. Thompson expressed similar views in the 1960s: BJL, John Saville papers, JS-109: Edward P. Thompson to John Saville, 31 Mar. n.y. [1958]; John Saville to Ralph [Samuel], 21 May 1958.

[85] Dirk Moses, 'Die 45er. Eine Generation zwischen Faschismus und Demokratie', *Neue Sammlung*, 40 (2000), pp.233–63.

[86] For an example cf. the cover of *pläne*, (1963) issues 6–7 which shows the symbols of earlier German youth movements.