Research output

Chapter (in Edited Book) ()

Judgements, Facts and Propositions: Theories of Truth in Russell, Wittgenstein and Ramsey (Forthcoming)

Citation
Johnston C & Sullivan P (2016) Judgements, Facts and Propositions: Theories of Truth in Russell, Wittgenstein and Ramsey (Forthcoming). In: Glanzberg M (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abstract
First paragraph: Our aim in this chapter is to outline a story that ought to be familiar and unsurprising, one that traces the fate of the correspondence theory of truth from its adoption by Russell in ‘On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood’ (1910) to its repudiation by Ramsey in ‘Facts and Propositions’ (1927). Central episodes in this story are indeed very familiar. But commonly held views of them, when placed one after the other, make for a story that is more surprising and less coherent than it should be: slightly misplaced emphasis at the beginning, regarding Russell’s reasons for adopting his new theories of judgement and truth, sets things off in a direction that leads to simple error in the middle, regarding Wittgenstein’s views in the Tractatus; this error then calls for a sudden and inexplicable plot-twist in the transition to the final chapter, regarding Ramsey’s position, which in consequence is bungled.

StatusIn press
EditorGlanzberg M
AuthorsJohnston Colin, Sullivan Peter
Publication date2016
PublisherOxford University Press
Place of publicationOxford
LanguageEnglish
© University of Stirling FK9 4LA Scotland UK • Telephone +44 1786 473171 • Scottish Charity No SC011159
My Portal