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Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge

Citation
Roca-Royes S (2011) Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge, Nous, 45 (1), pp. 22-49.

Abstract
The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge.

Keywords
Conceivability; Epistemology of Modality; De Re Modality; Essentialism

Subject headings
Modality (Logic; Essentialism (Philosophy); Life Origin

StatusPublished
AuthorsRoca-Royes Sonia
Publication date03/2011
URLhttp://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/117997227/home
PublisherWiley-Blackwell
ISSN 0029-4624
LanguageEnglish

Journal
Nous: Volume 45, Issue 1 (2011-03)

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